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group—appear to lack significant volume, thematic coherence, or
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dramatic impact. Indeed, particularly if the three non-mainstream
Winstar and Spent Nuclear Fuel cases are excluded, the court’s
government contracts output this calendar year seems unusually
small and highly disaggregated. Instinct suggests that 2010 will not
prove a memorable year for Federal Circuit government contracts
jurisprudence.
Accordingly, this Article will begin with some scholarly perspective
on, and empirical quantification of, the Federal Circuit’s level of
specialization and evolving jurisprudence in the field of government
contracts. The article then turns to a hodge-podge of, frankly,
unrelated cases grouped as follows: three award controversies (or bid
protests), a handful of post award performance disputes, a few
selections from the ongoing behemoths of litigation in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims—Winstar and Spent Nuclear Fuel, and a potentially
analogous implied warranty case.
The article resists the urge to characterize this relatively small,
2
disparate body of work. Indeed, I continue to struggle to divine
1. Forgive this distinction, but, as a general rule, my primary focus lies with the
more than $500 billion the U.S. government spends annually through Executive
branch procurement contracts, covered by the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), 48 C.F.R., and chronicled in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS—
Next Generation), available at https://www.fpds.gov and http://USASpending.gov.
To elaborate, the conventional world of federal government procurement contracts
is (1) typically defined by the government’s expenditure of Congressionallyappropriated funds, and (2) organized in terms of what the government is
purchasing (e.g., services (human capital and, typically, but not always, also
research), supplies (or deliverables), and construction (improvements to real
property)). Neither the aftermath of the Savings and Loan crisis nor the fallout from
the Yucca Mountain debacle, both discussed at some length below, fit neatly within
either model.
2. Nonetheless, I applaud the efforts of my predecessors who sought to do so.
See, e.g., David W. Burgett et al., 2006 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1073, 1115 (2007) (“The Federal Circuit did not issue any
particularly surprising or innovative rulings on government contracts, although there
were a number of instances in which the court reached different conclusions than
the COFC or Boards of Contract Appeals. While the Federal Circuit faces far fewer
government contract cases than do the tribunals whose decisions it reviews, it does
not hesitate to assert its independent judgment on questions of law in that realm, any
more than in fields such as patent law, that comprise a greater part of its own docket.
This should encourage practitioners who are unsuccessful in the first instance to
consider appeal in cases not clearly governed by Federal Circuit precedent.”); Daniel
P. Graham, et al., 2009 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 991, 995 (2010) (noting, among other things, that “the Federal Circuit
continued to decide questions of contract interpretation according to its view of the
‘plain meaning’ of the contract language at issue, in some cases concluding that this
plain meaning had eluded the lower tribunal”); Lionel M. Lavenue, Survey of
Government Contract Cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 1997
In Review, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1489 (1998) (“[G]overnment contract practitioners
may wish to become ever more active and visible in this court of appeals bar, a bar
that has traditionally focused primarily on patent law. After all, due to the
infrequency of Supreme Court review of government contract cases, the Federal
Circuit represents the court of last resort for virtually all matters involving
government contracts.”); David Robbins, 2004 Government Contract Decisions of the
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unifying themes that define the court’s government contracts
jurisprudence. If anything, I find myself increasingly drawn to the
perception that the court does not, and does not desire to, embrace
the unique nature of the federal government contract regime as an
analytical premise or predicate. Rather, the court prefers what some
have described as a more consistent, streamlined, simplified, or even
formalistic approach to its highly varied docket.
Where the Federal Circuit once resolved issues based upon “all the
facts and circumstances,” it now more often applies a discrete list of
factors. Where the court once employed standards, it now employs
rules. Where the court once had dense rules, they have become
leaner. In short, the Federal Circuit has embraced an increasingly
3
formal jurisprudence.

Of course, this convenient description is an over-simplification.
But it seems entirely consistent with the reality that, at least in the
government contracts sphere, the present court’s claim to
specialization is tenuous at best.
I.

SPECIALIZATION: SOME PERSPECTIVE

A. Government Contracts Specialization: An Empirical Snapshot
As his retirement approached, Chief Judge Paul Michel repeatedly
acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s lack of unique expertise in
contracts and, specifically, government contract law.
Judge Michel urged the members of the Government contracts
bar to consider seeking the nomination of persons with
Government contracts expertise and experience as replacements
for the Federal Circuit judges who would be retiring or taking
senior status . . . . [T]he appointment of one or more individuals
with such experience could go a long way towards raising the
court’s understanding of the real-world effects of its decisions in
4
the Government contracts area.
Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1205, 1238 (2005) (“While the Federal Circuit issued
a number of decisions that could be termed ‘pro-contractor,’ when taken as a whole,
the 2004 government contract decisions of the Federal Circuit likely will make life
more difficult for contractors. The lasting impact of the Federal Circuit’s ‘procontractor’ indemnification and price increase decisions will be outweighed by other
decisions restricting remedies available to contractors.”).
3. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773–74
(2003).
4. Robert K. Huffman, Federal Circuit Decisions On Government Contracts: Insights
From The Roundtable, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 8, at 25, 28 (Feb. 2010); see also Paul R.
Michel, Past, Present and Future in the Life of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2010) (“In my view, the wide variety of our preappointment experiences is actually the greatest strength of our court. Consider the
varied backgrounds of the present eleven non-patent law judges: one judge was a tax
lawyer; two were Assistant Solicitors General; one a law school dean; another a civil
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Of course, government contract law is not alone in this regard at
5
the Federal Circuit. In discussing the court’s diversity in the context
of then-pending vacancies at his final Judicial Conference, Judge
Michel “note[d] that [the] court lacks anyone from West of the
Allegheny Mountains, any Asian-American or African-American and
anyone appointed who has specialized in contract, international
6
trade, veterans or personnel law.” Granted, Judge Michel also
pointed out—at the time—the absence of any “former district
7
judges[;]” an absence which no longer persists.
Specialization can mean many things: whether training in, or
devoting oneself to, a specific area of study; pursuing a specific
occupation; or concentrating on a unique field.
Of course,
experience with or familiarity to the practice area prior to
nomination and appointment is one factor. But, as noted above, no
current Federal Circuit judges claim pre-appointment experience in
government contracts. After appointment, however, a steady diet of
cases should build a certain type of, at first, familiarity, and, over
time, expertise.
appeals specialist; three . . . came to the court with varied experiences that included
drafting legislation as Senate staffers; another had a civil practice in a distinguished
law firm; and another litigated for the United States before becoming a special
assistant to the then-Attorney General. . . . [T]hree judges had clerked for Supreme
Court Justices, and a fourth served as Special Assistant to the Chief Justice of the
United States after graduating from West Point and seeing combat duty in Vietnam,
experiencing private practice, and serving as Acting U.S. Special Counsel and a judge
on the Claims Court. So we are both patent specialists and nonspecialists . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
5. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821,
823 (2005) (“A related argument against the proposed national [patent] court was
based on the historical antipathy to ‘specialized’ courts, for common law tradition
favors a generalist approach to adjudication, at least in the appellate courts. The
concern is that specialists are likely to have a narrow viewpoint, and tend to favor
vested interests and lose sight of the larger national interest. Indeed, this concern
directed the design of the Federal Circuit to have extremely diverse subject matter
jurisdiction to reduce the risks of specialization.”) It appears, at least in the
government contracts, that any such risks remain low.
6. Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, State of the Court Address at the Judicial
Conference for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1–2 (May
20, 2010), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/stateofthecour
t10.pdf. Potential relief awaits for at least one of these areas of law, with the
nomination of Jimmie Reyna, an international trade specialist. Alas, at the time of
this writing, the nominations of Edward DuMont and Reyna remain pending.
Neither, of course, boasts pre-nomination strength or unique familiarity with
government contract law.
7. Judge Michel Offers Views on Federal Circuit Judicial Nominees, THE BLT: THE
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/03/judge-michel-offers-views-on-federalcircuit-judicial-nominees.html. Late last year, Judge Kathleen (Kate) O’Malley
became the first judge on the court with previous experience as a district court
judge. For more than 15 years, Judge O’Malley served as a U.S. District Judge in the
Northern District of Ohio.
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The numbers do not demonstrate a steady diet. Not surprisingly,
in 2010, most Federal Circuit judges were not exposed to a large
8
number of government contracts cases. Indeed, as Table 1, below,
demonstrates, in 2010, no judge participated in ten, and the vast
majority of judges participated in fewer than half a dozen,
government contracts related matters. Of course, judges participated
9
in many more cases than they wrote. Judge Bryson, the most prolific
writer on government contracts matters, participated in nine cases,
and Judge Lourie participated in eight. Four judges participated in
five cases—Judges Newman, Prost, and Rader; two judges participated
in four cases—Dyk and Moore. Judges Clevenger, Linn, and Mayer
each participated in three; Judge Gajarsa participated in two.
Far more striking is that, in 2010, only one Federal Circuit judge,
Judge Bryson, wrote more than two government contracts related
decisions. Judge Bryson issued five opinions. Two judges—Judges
Prost and Dyson—wrote two. Judge Dyson, however, also wrote two
concurring opinions; earning him the bragging rights as the second
most prolific judge on these matters. Five judges—Judges Gajarsa,
Linn, Lourie, Mayer, and Rader—wrote one. Judge Gajarsa, however,
also drafted the only dissenting opinion in a government contracts
related case in 2010. Neither Judge Michel nor Judge Moore drafted
a government contracts related opinion in 2010, nor did Senior
Judges Archer, Clevenger, Friedman, Plager, or Schall. In other
words, Judge Mayer was the only senior judge (or judge entering a
retirement year) to participate in a government contracts matter and
also write an opinion.

8. In the spirit of full disclosure, case selection methodology is neither entirely
scientific nor uniformly consistent. Accordingly, in the appendices to this Article, I
list the cases I have included, and readers can decide whether I have been overly
inclusive or exclusive. For example, I chose not to include Bormes v. United States, 626
F.3d 574 (Fed. Cir. 2010), a class action brought pursuant to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a), that morphed into a complex
jurisdictional challenge, and produced some extensive—but, for the purposes of this
article, largely irrelevant—analysis of the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
Conversely, I included—but did not discuss separately in this Article—Arctic Slope
Native Assoc. v. Sebelius, No. 2010-1013, 2010 WL 5129708 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2010),
where the court affirmed the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA’s) grant of
summary judgment in favor of the government in “the latest in a long-running
dispute between the various Indian tribes and the Secretary concerning the
Secretary’s obligation to pay contract support costs” under a contract to supply
health services under the Indian Self-Determination Act. Id. at 1 (citing Arctic Slope
Native Assoc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., CBCA 294-ISDA, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,281
(C.B.C.A. 2009)).
9. Two cases—Sullivan v. United States, 625 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per
curiam), and Ham Investments, LLC v. United States, 388 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(per curiam)—were issued per curiam, and the judges received credit for
participating but not writing the opinion.
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Table 1: Government Contracts Activity Per Federal Circuit Judge 2010
Participated
in Decision

Participated
Without
Writing

Drafted
Decision

Bryson

9

4

5

Lourie

8

7

1

Newman

5

5

Prost

5

3

2

Rader

5

4

1

Dyk

4

Moore

4

4

Linn

3

2

Gajarsa

2

Michel10

1

Judge

Concurring
Decision

2

Dissenting
Decision

2

1
1

1

1
Senior Judges, etc.

Clevenger

3

3

Mayer

3

2

Archer

1

1

Friedman

1

1

Plager

1

1

Schall

1

1

Kendall11

1

1

1

As detailed in Appendices A and B, which identify the cases
summarized in Tables 1 and 2, even this level of participation
somewhat exaggerates the various judges’ exposure to government
contracts matters. For example, Nebraska Public Power District v. United
12
States, decided en banc and discussed at length below, involved
twelve judges. In addition, Judge Rader received full credit for
penning the unpublished, non-precedential opinion in Ham
13
Investments, LLC v. United States. In what can fairly be described as
an unremarkable case, the court found “no genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Government waived the requirements of the
Anti-Assignment Acts” and affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’
14
grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. My sense is
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Retired, May, 2010.
District Judge sitting by designation.
(NPPD II) 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
388 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Id. at 961.
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that little or no familiarity with federal government contracting was
15
required for the court to resolve this matter. Indeed, the court
explained that “HAM does not argue on appeal that the assignment
met the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Acts. Thus, this court
need not address that issue[, and] the only issue on appeal is whether
the Government waived the requirements of the Anti-Assignment
16
Acts.”
Conversely, the process may not have been fully consistent in not
17
including Sullivan v. United States, a short, per curiam decision.
Sullivan was excluded from formal discussion because the Federal
Circuit concluded that it was not a government contract case. After a
United States Postal Service contractor’s truck hit the Sullivans’ car,
Mrs. Sullivan received $20,000, the maximum liability coverage under
18
the contractor’s insurance policy.
The Postal Service contract,
however, required the contractor to carry at least $750,000 in liability
19
insurance, but the contractor failed to do so. The Sullivans sued as
third party beneficiaries to the Postal Service contract, asserting that,
as motorists, they were intended to benefit from the contract’s
20
insurance requirements. That seemed like a reasonable argument,
21
and the trial court agreed. The Federal Circuit, however, was not
22
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Federal
persuaded.
Circuit explained: “Regardless of whether the trial court properly
classified the Sullivans as third party beneficiaries, the Sullivans still
could not succeed in this breach of contract action against the

15. None of this should suggest that anti-assignment issues are either
unimportant or uninteresting. See generally Heidi M. Schooner & Steven L. Schooner,
Look Before You Lend: A Lender’s Guide to Financing Government Contracts Pursuant to the
Assignment of Claims Act, 48 BUS. LAWYER 535 (1993). Here, in a lengthy decision, rich
in factual detail and sprinkled liberally with deposition testimony, the lower court,
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, concluded that no valid assignment of payments
had taken place. Ham Invs., LLC v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 537, 553 (2009), aff’d
388 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The trial court fleshed out two
issues: whether the assignee qualified under the statutory and regulatory definition
of a “financing institution” and whether the government waived certain statutory
requirements. Id. at 548–52. “The Anti-Assignment Acts limit assignments of
government contracts to third parties. . . . Statutory exceptions, however, may allow
assignments, but only if certain requirements are fulfilled.” Id. at 547, (citing
31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2006); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (renumbered as 41 U.S.C. § 6305
pursuant to Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, 124 Stat. 3677, 3804 which
recodified Title 41)).
16. Ham Investments, 388 F. App’x at 960.
17. 625 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 1379.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1380–81.
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Government. [The contractor], in whose shoes the Sullivans must
23
stand, breached the contract, not the Government.”
Granted, the sparse number of government contracts cases looks
less stark when the more numerous cases from the prior year, 2009,
are combined with 2010. Indeed, the numbers more than double, to
the extent that 2010 appears to have been a relatively light year. Still,
over a two-year period, some trends become slightly more
pronounced. Judge Bryson remains the most prolific judge on
government contract matters. Moreover, at least in my opinion, he
drafted two or three of the more significant opinions in 2010. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, Judge Moore, a patent scholar before
joining the bench, appears to have been the only active judge not to
draft a government contract opinion in either 2009 or 2010. More
significantly, all five senior judges and six active judges—Judges Linn,
Lourie, Michel, Moore, Newman, and Rader—drafted two, one, or no
opinions over a two-year period. Judge Michel’s service as Chief
Judge and his pending retirement make his inclusion less significant
and any concern regarding his lack of participation substantively less
noteworthy than that of Judge Moore.
Table 2: Government Contracts Activity Per
Federal Circuit Judge 2009 and 2010 (combined)
Judge

Participated
in Decision

Participated
Without
Writing

Drafted
Decision

Concurring
Decision

Dissenting
Decision

Bryson

16

7

9

Lourie

15

13

1

1

Newman

12

9

2

1

Prost

10

5

5

Rader

12

10

2

Dyk

12

3

6

Moore

6

6

Linn

6

5

1

Gajarsa

7

2

3

Michel24

5

4

1

Schall25

9

5

4

2

1

2

23. Sullivan v. United States, 625 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
For an extensive discussion of an ill-conceived legislative solution to such a potential
contractor liability, see Schooner, infra note 187.
24. Retired, May, 2010.
25. Judge Schall took senior status in 2009.
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Senior Judges
Clevenger

4

3

1

Mayer

10

8

2

Archer

1

1

Friedman

3

2

1

Plager

4

2

2

Judges Sitting By Designation
Arterton26

1

1

Huff27

1

1

Kendall

1

1

Posner29

1

1

Walker30

1

28

31

Ward

1

1
1

In light of this empirical snapshot, it seems reasonable to ask
whether this rather light volume of government contracts decisions
32
permits judges to become specialists. The frequency with which
judges have sat by designation on these matters might suggest that
they are not daunted by the issues involved. Indeed, particularly in
26. District Judge sitting by designation.
27. District Judge sitting by designation.
28. District Judge sitting by designation.
29. Circuit Judge sitting by designation.
30. Chief District Judge sitting by designation.
31. District Judge sitting by designation.
32. It is not my intent here to rehash (but, instead, add an empirical element to)
this debate. That ground has been, and continues to be, consistently trodden.
The potential benefits of placing the adjudication of all contract claims
against the government in one court and thus building a single consistent
body of government contract law are well known. . . . Generalist courts
accustomed to normal contract disputes will not be able to strike an effective
or consistent balance between treating the government as sovereign and
treating it as a typical party to a contract, especially when they deal with such
cases only sporadically.
Not all commentators agree, of course. Some argue that an extra
tribunal unnecessarily consumes resources, creates wasteful jurisdictional
disputes, and leads to inefficient adjudication.
Daniel Thies, Recent Development: The Decline of the Court of Federal Claims in Nebraska
Public Power District v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1203, 1214–15 (2010) (citing Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing
the Empirical Case for the Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 751, 770–71
(2003) (pointing out the number of contract suits that are adjudicated elsewhere in
the federal system, thus minimizing the benefits of specialization, and arguing that
the COFC’s docket could be distributed to the district courts at minimal additional
cost)); see Joshua I. Schwartz, Public Contracts Specialization as a Rationale for the Court of
Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 863, 863 (2003) (“[T]he semi-specialization of
the [Court of Federal Claims] in litigation arising from government contracts lends it
uniquely a genuine potential to contribute to the salutary development of the law in
this field.”).
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light of the non-mainstream government contracts cases included in
this review—most dramatically, the non-procurement and, arguably,
sui generis, Winstar cases and the Spent Nuclear Fuel cases—it seems
that most Federal Circuit judges have very limited in-depth exposure
33
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the uniform,
government-wide regulation that applies to executive agency
procurement contracts.
As noted above, it appears that Judge Bryson has taken the lead in
crafting the court’s opinions in government contracts. Judge
Bryson’s work appears careful and well reasoned, but it remains
unclear whether Judge Bryson offers a unique philosophy on these
cases, and only time will tell if he sustains his current pace. More
broadly, few Federal Circuit judges present an extensive, consistent
body of work. Probably the most significant exception would be
Judge Pauline Newman. Whether I agree with Judge Newman—or,
34
whether, as a young Justice Department advocate, I expected a

33. 48 C.F.R. Chapter 1 contains the government-wide regulation, and the
following chapters represent agency-level supplements to the regulation.
34. It seems only appropriate, on this note, to mention that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for the purpose of reviewing to what extent the government’s
invocation of the state secrets privilege may have impacted the outcome of this longrunning litigation. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Boeing Co. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).
Oral argument took place on January 18, 2011. The Federal Circuit described this
litigation as the American version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce, id. at 1342, the fictional
court case in the Charles Dickens novel Bleak House. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
20 (Signet Classic 1980) (1853) (“This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time,
become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means.”). This stage of
appellate review guarantees that this long running dispute will survive into its
twentieth year. In June of 1991, when the contractors filed their lawsuit in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims, I was a trial attorney at the Department of Justice. Now,
“final resolution . . . may well turn on the complicated and little explored interplay
between the Government’s right to protect highly sensitive information [in] dispute
resolution on contracts involving that information.” Neil H. O’Donnell & Dennis J.
Callahan, Feature Comment: The A-12 Saga Continues, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 388,
Dec. 8, 2010, at 1–3; see also Nash, January 2011, 25 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 1, at 1 (Jan.
2011) [hereinafter Nash, January]. My predecessor on this faculty, Ralph Nash,
criticized the reasoning of the Federal Circuit’s 2003 decision for reasons I revisit, in
a similar context, in this article’s discussion of Maropakis, infra Part II.B. The Federal
Circuit reasoned
that the nondisclosure of vital information defense was not a normal
defense because the contractors were plaintiffs presenting a contractor
claim . . . . . . [U]nder the Contract Disputes Act, contractors are always
the plaintiffs even though they are litigating Government claims. Up until
the Federal Circuit decision, almost everyone had understood that this was
merely a procedural matter but that the Government was the actual party
asserting the claim when litigating the validity of a default termination.
(The burden of proof has always been on the Government to uphold the
validity of the default termination.) . . . [M]aking contractors plaintiffs in
all cases [may be] a “convenient fiction.” But the Federal Circuit’s analysis
makes it rather inconvenient for the contractors (at a cost of
approximately $3 billion).
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daunting challenge persuading her—I respect her consistency and
vision. As an academic, I admit a fondness for overarching principles
35
and theories that help explain regimes or resolve difficult problems.
Accordingly, I find myself increasingly drawn to her opinions,
perspective, and jurisprudence.
B. Judge Newman: A Unique Niche?
Long well-respected in the patent bar, Judge Newman also has
established a unique place in government contracts. Stanfield
Johnson’s recent article chronicles her highly individualistic quest
36
and heralds her as the court’s “great dissenter.” Johnson makes a
compelling case that over a twenty-year period, particularly through
her numerous dissenting opinions, Judge Newman has articulated a
unique judicial approach to government contracts cases. More
importantly, she effectively has distinguished herself from her judicial
colleagues. Judge Newman’s “dissents respectfully but emphatically
criticize her colleagues for not recognizing legitimate interests of
contractors . . . seeking remedies from the Government . . . [and]
consistently reflect the view that a primary responsibility of the court
37
is to serve ‘the national policy of fairness to contractors.’”
Johnson accurately describes Judge Newman’s judicial approach
towards government contracts over the years as “persistent—and

Nash, January, supra ¶ 1, at 1. It is hard not to be at least somewhat cynical about an
acquisition regime and a judicial system that permits this story to continue unfolding
today. See also Natanya DeWeese & James Rumpf, General Dynamics Corp. v. United
States
(09-1298); Boeing Company v. United States (09-1302), LIIBULLETIN,
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/09-1298 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
35. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government
Contract Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV 103, 110 (2002) (“Ultimately, each
government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to delegate to its
buyers. . . . No system can achieve all of [the discussed] goals. Nor can a state expect
that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time. Determining which
goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge.”); Christopher R.
Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model,
40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63, 63–64 (2010) (“Long established in economics and the other
social sciences, the principal-agent model . . . provides a model to explain successes
(and failures) in organizational structures, and also to understand the procurement
system and its rules.”); see also RALPH C. NASH, JR. ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
REFERENCE BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT
(3d ed. 2007) (organizing the variety of government contract terms and definitions
alphabetically).
36. W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National
Policy of Fairness to Contractors”, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 275 (2011).
37. Id. at 276 (manuscript at 3) (citing England v. Contel Advanced Sys., Inc.,
384 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting)).
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38

I sense that he is correct to employ the word
largely lonely[.]”
39
“advocacy” in describing her jurisprudence. Johnson explains that:
At the core of Judge Newman’s dissenting jurisprudence is the
premise that the sovereign as a contracting party should be
accountable for its actions, subject only to limited exceptions not to
be presumed, unnecessarily expanded, or imposed in a formalistic,
doctrinaire way that ignores or masks the facts of government
conduct. Where the facts justify it, contractors should be entitled
to a “fair and just” remedy, and the Federal Circuit is there to make
40
sure this happens.

Indeed, Johnson properly identifies Newman’s unique place on the
court’s spectrum in the context of the never ending balance that
must be struck in government contracts cases: “How [should judges]
harmonize the court’s general duty to hold the Government
accountable under the law of contracts with its duty to protect the
41
sovereign and its funds? Which judicial duty has priority?” Some of
Johnson’s most compelling analysis derives from his frustration
that—despite years of her “advocacy”—Judge Newman appears to
have gained little ground in moving the court along the spectrum
toward a hypothetical center. Despite the historical grounding of her
jurisprudence, Judge Newman apparently has failed to convert her
colleagues.
Her jurisprudence is so consistent with the authorized history of
the jurisdiction inherited from the Court of Claims, declaring the
court as a nation’s “conscience,” that one wonders why she appears
a maverick among the judges of the Federal Circuit. And why is
she so frequently alone in objecting to obstacles to justice raised by
her colleagues, frustrating the court’s historic “unique and
permanent contribution” of making “Government officials
42
accountable?

As discussed at length below, Judge Newman proved true to form
43
in 2010, dissenting in M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States,
expressing disapproval, if not exasperation, with the majority’s
44
unwillingness to protect the interest of a government contractor.

38. Id. at 333.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 338.
41. Id. at 339. “In some respects the differences between Judge Newman and her
colleagues involve this sorting out process—with Judge Newman on what might be
called the liberal equitable side, and the majorities on the conservative, stricter side
of the divide.” Id.
42. Id. at 333 (citing 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
CLAIMS: A HISTORY 170 (1978)).
43. 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
44. Id. at 1332, 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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C. A Level Playing Field?
What is particularly striking about this long running debate is that,
in the end, it returns to the amount of deference that the
government enjoys in federal court and, more specifically, in a highly
specialized appellate court, in Washington, D.C., with a heavy diet of
cases in which the government is one of the parties. Johnson
correctly “suspect[s] the reader will . . . find that his or her own
judgments will turn on fundamental views about what the
relationship between the sovereign and its contractors should be—
and what the role of the Federal Circuit in overseeing that
45
relationship should be.”
In other words, most readers will not
hesitate, when confronted with a government contracts case, to opine
whether the Federal Circuit should attempt to manage a level playing
field, or whether the government—for whatever reason—should
expect to enjoy a leg up. Consistent with a career in private practice,
Johnson voices the perspective that: “One would think that . . . the
Federal Circuit would provide a level playing field between the
sovereign and its contractors [a]nd, further, that the court would
without hesitation seek to serve its historic mission of holding the
46
Government accountable as the law would hold private individuals.”
For those unfamiliar with this aspect of the court’s jurisprudence,
Johnson persuasively disabuses the notion of the level playing field.
Rather, as a general rule, the government, as defendant and litigant,
enjoys both deference and access to a broad arsenal of defenses.
Looking back, the congressionally created Acquisition Advisory
47
Panel’s 2007 report attempted to air this issue. The panel began
from the premise that the:
fundamental difference between government and commercial
contracting is unequal treatment of the parties in the contracting
process. The government enjoys certain contractual “advantages”
by virtue of its status as the “sovereign” resulting in benefits from
the centuries-old, judicially created doctrine of sovereign or
governmental immunity. The prime example of this doctrine is
that the government cannot be sued unless (and only to the extent
48
that) it consents to be sued . . . .

Conversely, “[t]he United States Supreme Court . . . has held for
some 130 years that the same rules of contract interpretation and

45. Johnson, supra note 36 at 333.
46. Id. at 343.
47. REPORT OF THE ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL TO THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (Jan. 2007), available at
https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/finalaapreport.html.
48. Id. at 84 (emphasis removed).
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performance apply to both the government and contractors.” The
Acquisition Advisory Panel, however, described a phenomenon in
which the courts and board of contract appeals have ignored the
Supreme Court’s guidance and provided favorable treatment to the
government rather than contractors without a statutory,
Constitutional, or contractual basis. “These areas included the
presumption of regularity (that actions of the government were
conducted properly and correctly), estoppel against the government,
50
the presumption of good faith, and interest as damages.”
Ultimately, the panel found that providing unequal treatment in
government contracts is “inconsistent with commercial practices[.]”
The government and its contractors should enjoy equal treatment
“unless the Constitution of the United States or special
51
considerations of the public interest require otherwise.”
All of
which leads, in Johnson’s opinion, to “the bottom-line effect that the
52
Government avoids accountability and the public fisc is protected.”
From this, Johnson concludes:
[T]he Federal Circuit has made protection of the public fisc its
priority. Plainly, . . . it is no longer considered a priority or “special
responsibility” of the court “to make government officials
accountable to the citizens whose servants they are” or for the
Government “to render prompt justice against itself.” And thus, sad
to say, the court no longer defines “its mission” as “hold[ing] and
53
speak[ing] a nation’s conscience.”

D. The Federal Circuit’s Role?
Johnson was not alone in voicing this theme in 2010. My
predecessor and colleague, Emeritus Professor Ralph C. Nash, Jr.,
articulated that, historically, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the

49. Id. at 85.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 98. The panel also noted the concluding language in the American Bar
Association’s Section of Public Contract Law’s comments:
The contractor and the Government shall enjoy the same legal
presumptions, if any, in discharging their duties and in exercising their
rights in connection with the performance of any Government contract, and
either party’s attempt to rebut any legal presumption that applies to the
other party’s conduct shall be subject to a uniform evidentiary standard that
applies equally to both parties.
Id. at 86 (quoting Letter from A.B.A. Section of Pub. Contract Law to
Laura Auletta, Exec. Dir., Gen. Servs. Admin. (June 22, 2006), available at
https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/documents/sectionofpubliccontractlawaba22june06.pdf.
52. Johnson, supra note 36 at 343.
53. Id. at 346 (citing 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
CLAIMS: A HISTORY (1978) at 170–71).
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Court of Claims, “perceived itself as the conscience of the nation.”
Indeed, that court’s output and generally accepted philosophy
indicated that “[n]othing could be more important than ensuring
that the citizens of this country believe that their federal government
55
treats them fairly.” Today, Nash joins Johnson in concluding that
the “Federal Circuit seems to have slowly drifted away from this view
56
of its role.”
Nash offers “three possible factors moving the Federal Circuit in
57
the direction it has taken.” First, he postulates that the court prefers
strict, rather than flexible, rules for the government’s public
procurement regime. “There seems to be a belief that there are no
shades of gray in contracting—that the issues are either black or
58
white.”
Nash also senses that the Federal Circuit’s judges
increasingly appear to mistrust trial judges, whether at the U.S. Court
59
of Federal Claims or at the agency boards of contract appeals.
The fashioning of strict legal rules appears to be taking discretion
away from the judges on the Court of Federal Claims and the
boards of contract appeals to assess the facts fully and seek a fair
outcome. This trend can be seen in [many] areas . . . particularly
in the accounting area demanding use of the Eichleay formula to
the exclusion of accounting evidence, thereby depriving judges of
the advice of experts in complex accounting matters. The reversals
of carefully analyzed board decisions in Winter and Rumsfeld are
striking in this regard. Yet the board judges are the most
experienced judges in their field in the federal arena—with a
requirement of five years of experience before appointment and
having served, in most cases, for many years hearing only
government contract disputes. Similarly, the judges on the Court
of Federal Claims are highly competent—albeit with less
government contracts experience. Historically, all of these judges
have demonstrated the ability to sift through complex facts and
apply the law to arrive at a fair result. The Federal Circuit’s efforts
60
to restrict this endeavor seem misplaced.

54. Ralph C. Nash, Jr., The Government Contracts Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 586, 587 (2010) [hereinafter Nash, Government Contracts].
55. Id. at 587–88.
56. Id. at 588.
57. Id. at 612.
58. Id. at 612. Nash criticizes this perception, pointing out that all contract
disputes, particularly with interpretation and authority disputes, turn on case specific
facts and the legal rules to be applied to those facts. “The dogmatic application of a
strict legal rule in these situations—without a close analysis of the factual nuances—
can lead to unfair results.” Id. at 612–13.
59. Id. at 613.
60. Id.
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Nash’s third theory for explaining the trend is that the court would
like to “impose more rigorous standards on the people in the
government and industry that draft and perform government
61
Nash suggests, and few would disagree, “that
contracts.”
government contracting would be more effective if all of the
participants in the process were more careful in the language that
they use and the techniques they adopt to achieve satisfactory
62
performance.”
Like Nash, however, I am not sanguine that
attempting to impose such an outcome, by force of will, will bear fruit
63
either for the court or the taxpayers. Ultimately, as a result, Nash
concludes that the government, the private sector, and the public are
worse off. “It appears that the court does not seek to show the
64
citizenry that the government deals fairly with it.”
While that
assessment may seem harsh, the weight of precedent indicates that it
is increasingly accurate.
E. Another Way Forward?
There may be another way forward—not necessarily that the
Federal Circuit should be more solicitous of contractors and
claimants, but rather that the court’s judges should more fully
recognize, and engage in, their roles in shaping the evolving
government procurement legal regime. That was certainly the Court
of Claims’ role, in its heyday, before the Federal Acquisition
Regulation helped codify and harmonize federal procurement law in
65
1984. The old Court of Claims, which was folded into the Federal
61. Id. at 614.
62. Id.
63. Id. First,
[g]overnment contracting is done by business-trained people, generally
without legal training, who are pressed for time to get their immediate task
accomplished. Thus, most contracts are signed without careful legal review,
and the major contracts are so complex that even legal review is not likely to
catch all of the glitches in the document. These same contracts are
frequently performed under stressful conditions where the main focus is to
get the job done. The people on both sides of the transaction generally try
to follow the precise rules applicable to government procurement, but there
are inevitable failures in this regard.
Id. Second, it is unrealistic, for the foreseeable future, to expect a significant
upgrade in the performance of the government’s acquisition workforce, which has
been stretched past the breaking point. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S.
Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible
Governance, 6 J. CONT. MGMT. 9 (Summer 2008) (arguing that there is no short-term
solution to the lack of resources available to the Department of Homeland Security
and other agencies).
64. Nash, Government Contracts, supra note 54, at 614.
65. The FAR took effect on April 1, 1984. The rule-makers’ description of the
new, consolidated regulation sheds light on its purpose and, more broadly, hints at
why some authority may have shifted from the courts to the rule-makers: the
transaction costs of running and enhancing complex procurement systems drop
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Circuit, served a central role in defining and refining federal
66
procurement law.
In many ways, the Federal Circuit today has
departed from that role.
The other two branches of government, in contrast, are intensely
engaged in shaping the procurement law regime; in practice,
Congress and the Executive Branch often compete for primacy. The
most recent defense authorization act, for example, included
67
68
provisions on business systems regulation and intellectual property

dramatically if direction for that system can come from a centralized rulemaking
process, rather than from the courts. The introductory statement for the FAR stated,
in late 1983:
The [FAR] establishes (a) a single regulation for use by all Executive
agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated
funds, and (b) the [FAR] System consisting of the FAR and agency
acquisition regulations that implement or supplement the FAR. The FAR is
prepared, issued, and maintained, and the [FAR] System is prescribed,
jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services,
and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
under their several statutory authorities. The FAR, together with agency
supplemental regulations, replaces the current Federal Procurement
Regulations System, the Defense Acquisition Regulation, and the NASA
Procurement Regulation. . . . The major intended effects of the FAR are to
(a) produce a clear, understandable document that maximizes feasible
uniformity in the acquisition process, (b) reduce the proliferation of agency
acquisition regulations, (c) implement recommendations made by the
Commission on Government Procurement, the Federal Paperwork
Commission, various Congressional groups, and others, and (d) facilitate
agency, industry, and public participation in the development and
maintenance of the FAR and agency acquisition regulations.
Establishing the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 42102, 42102 (Sept. 19,
1983) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. Ch. 1) (emphasis added).
66. Paul D. Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit: A Model For
Reform?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 577 (2010) (noting that the Court of Claims
folded into the Federal Circuit); see Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731,
732 (2004) (noting that the Federal Circuit accepted as binding precedent the law of
the Court of Claims); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 821, 823–24 (2005) (explaining the origins of the Federal Circuit); Daniel J.
Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First 20 Years—A Historical View, 11 FED.
CIR. B.J. 557, 558 (2001-2002) (explaining the formation of the Federal Circuit);
Pauline Newman, Origins of the Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11 FED. CIR. B.J.
541, 541 (2001-2002) (describing the origins of the Federal Circuit). See generally 2
WILSON COWEN, ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY (1978)
(summarizing Court of Claims’ procurement caselaw).
67. Compare Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 893, 124 Stat. 4137 (2011) [hereinafter Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act] (directing the Secretary of Defense to initiate a
program for the improvement of contractor business systems with Congressional
guidelines), with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Business
Systems—Definition and Administration, 75 Fed. Reg. 75550 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be
codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 215, 234, 242, 244, 245, and 252) (proposing an
amendment of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to
improve the Department of Defense’s oversight of contract business systems)
(proposed rule). See generally Christopher R. Yukins & Kristen E. Ittig, Feature
Comment: The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011—A Bounded Step Forward for
Acquisition Reform, 53 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 8, Jan. 12, 2011, at 7 (describing the
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that in many ways overlapped pending regulatory reforms. This
vibrant exchange between Congress and the regulators means, in
practice, that the U.S. procurement regime hurtles more rapidly
down an evolutionary path of improvement. Because other systems
69
proceed on parallel paths, it seems reasonable to assume that if the
Federal Circuit engaged more actively and knowledgeably, the U.S.
system would move ever more rapidly towards progress.
Besides the Court of Claims’ historical model, there are
contemporary examples for a fully engaged circuit—a full partner in
the legislative and regulatory efforts to develop the law. The Second
Circuit is well known for its contributions to securities law, and the
D.C. Circuit plays an enormous role in shaping administrative and
antitrust law. In short, there is no reason for the Federal Circuit not
to engage more fully, and serve as the third co-equal branch in
shaping procurement law in the federal government.
II. THE 2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS CASES
This journey now turns to what the introduction previously
described as a rather small hodge-podge of, frankly, unrelated
government contracts cases resolved by the Federal Circuit in 2010.
The article first discusses three award controversy or bid protests
matters. Then, it examines a handful of post-award performance or
contract administration disputes. The article then directs attention
to a few selections from the ongoing behemoths of litigation in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims—the sui generic Winstar and Spent
Nuclear Fuel debacles.
Finally, the piece concludes—I think
fittingly—with a potentially analogous implied warranty case.

conflict between legislative and rulemaking efforts to improve contractor business
systems).
68. Compare Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act § 801, with Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Patents, Data, and Copyrights, 75 Fed.
Reg. 59412 (Sept. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 212, 227, 246, and 252)
(proposing amendments to the DFARS rule on technical data rights).
69. See Steen Treumer, The Discretionary Powers of Contracting Entities—Towards a
Flexible Approach in the Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice?,
15 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2006) (discussing the growing role that the
European Court of Justice is playing in shaping European member states’
procurement law). My colleagues and I continue to see great value in looking
abroad. See Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the
Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 529, 565 (2007)
(describing among other things, “rationalization, the process of ensuring that the
instruments being relied upon by individual states to open markets do, in fact,
produce a legislative and regulatory template for procurement procedures which are
fundamentally sound (e.g., reflect best practices) and which produce efficient, valuebased results”).
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A. Disappointed Offeror Litigation or Bid Protests
70

In Resource Conservation Group v. United States, problems arose out
of the attempt to lease the former Naval Academy dairy farm
property. Resource Conservation Group proposed to lease the
71
property so that it could mine it for sand and gravel.
The
contracting officer determined that mining would entail the disposal
of real property and, therefore, deemed Resource Conservation’s
72
proposal outside the scope of the solicitation.
Resource
Conservation sued, in the United States Court of Federal Claims, but
did not challenge the actual award of the contract. Rather, it merely
sought to recover the $500,000 it expended in bid preparation costs
73
and fees. Resource Conservation asserted that the government’s
failure to timely warn prospective offerors of its interpretation
74
foreclosed Resource Conservation’s offer.
Among other things,
Resource Conservation alleged that the Navy breached the implied
75
contract of fair and honest consideration.
The court “express[ed] no opinion on whether the government
was obligated to inform potential bidders of the perceived limitations
76
imposed by 10 U.S.C. § 6976[,]” so the only real significance of the
case lies in what seems to be the never ending saga of federal court
77
disappointed offeror jurisdiction. The court revisited the scope of
the Court of Federal Claims’ bid protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491. Because the matter involved the lease of government
property, rather than a government purchase, the court concluded
that “the Court of Federal Claims was correct in holding that relief
78
under 1491(b)(1) is unavailable outside the procurement context.”
But the case is far more interesting to the extent that the court
determined that the COFC could assert implied-in-fact jurisdiction
over nonprocurement solicitations. The court concluded that “the
implied-in-fact contract jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)

70. 597 F.3d 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
71. Id. at 1240.
72. Id. at 1241.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1240–41.
76. Res. Conservation Grp. v. United States, 597 F.3d 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
77. Prior to the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, federal district courts
exercised jurisdiction—separate and apart from the Tucker Act—under the
Administrative Procedure Act to review challenges to the award of federal
government contract. See, e.g., Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (holding that the Administrative Procedure Act entitled aggrieved bidders
judicial review).
78. Res. Conservation Grp., 597 F.3d at 1245.
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that existed prior to 1996 survived the enactment of the ADRA, . . .
79
where the new statute does not provide a remedy.”
Specifically, the court rejected the government’s argument that
“continuation of the implied-in-fact jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with the purposes of the ADRA, which clearly was designed to place
all bid protest challenges in a single court (after a sunset period)
80
under a single standard (the APA standard).” The court went so far
as to intuit that, based upon its analysis, “a disappointed bidder in a
nonprocurement case could also theoretically bring its bid protest
challenge in a federal district court, since the ADRA only repealed
81
jurisdiction over procurement cases.”
The court conceded that
“[D]ividing jurisdiction between the Court of Federal Claims and the
district courts for non-procurement bid protests may lead to similar
problems that led to the enactment of 1491(b)(1). However, if the
statute [must] be amended, that amendment must be undertaken by
82
Congress and not this court.”
One surprising feature of this decision is how the court considers
“the meaning of the phrase ‘in connection with a procurement or a
83
proposed procurement.’” The court explains that “[i]n construing
statutory language, we look to dictionary definitions published at the
84
time that the statute was enacted.” That seems fine, but the reader
is not alone in thinking that a better place to start may have been
85
with Title 41 of the United States Code, which the court

79. Id.
80. Id. at 1246.
81. Id. at 1246 n.12.
82. Id. at 1246. I hope that the worst case scenario does not play out.
Experience suggests that clear jurisdictional lines produce far more efficient
outcomes. See, e.g., Christopher M. Chaisson, et al., The Sunset of Scanwell Jurisdiction
and the Award of Attorney’s Fees to Disappointed Offerors, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 65, 86–87
(2000) (urging that district courts maintain jurisdiction over bid protest cases);
Michael F. Mason, Bid Protests and the U.S. District Courts—Why Congress Should Not
Allow the Sun to Set on this Effective Relationship, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 567, 597 (1997)
(concluding that the district courts have served as an adequate court to remedy
government violations of procurement laws); Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment:
Watching The Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study Of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction In
The COFC And The District Courts, 42 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 108, Mar. 22, 2000, at 3–4
(asserting that GAO should have concluded that the elimination of District Court
jurisdiction would hinder the opportunity of small businesses to challenge violations
of federal procurement law); Peter Verchinski, Are District Courts Still a Viable Forum for
Bid Protests?, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 404 (2003) (arguing that district courts provide
an adequate alternative forum for small business in bid protest cases).
83. Res. Conservation Grp., 597 F.3d at 1243.
84. Id. at 1243–44 (discussing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (6th ed. 1990), and
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1809 (1993)).
85. See Office of Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 403 (2006) (renumbered as
41 U.S.C. § 111 pursuant to Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, 124 Stat. 3677,
3681 which recodified Title 41) (defining the term “procurement” as used in public
contracts).
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subsequently addresses. As Ralph Nash noted, commenting on the
Federal Circuit’s reliance on dictionary definitions:
This is backwards. Dictionary definitions of terms of art in the
world of Government contracting are a highly unlikely source of
meaning, much less plain meaning. Yet the court is wedded to
dictionaries . . . [B]oth Mr. Webster and Mr. Black are long gone
and neither they nor their successors have had the vaguest notion
of how words are used when the Federal Government buys goods
86
and services.

That seems eminently reasonable. Context matters.
While I am hesitant to call any government contracts case
uninteresting, some are; yet I do appreciate periodically seeing the
court describe the government’s actions as rational. In Savantage
87
Financial Services, Inc. v. United States, the court affirmed the COFC’s
denial of a garden variety pre-award protest. The protest arose when
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “required proposers to
offer a system that is integrated and currently fully operational within
88
the federal government.” Obviously, such a requirement restricts
89
competition, which, in a vacuum, is inappropriate.
90
The court found the restriction reasonable. Among other things:
“On a question such as whether to implement a pre-integrated system
or to build a system by beginning with a core financial system and
then integrating other systems afterwards, an agency’s preferences
91
are entitled to great weight.” Further, to the extent that DHS had
struggled to create such a system from the ground up, the “DHS
could reasonably prefer a system that is already operating
92
successfully.”
93
In Pai Corp. v. United States, the court, affirming the COFC, chose
not to overturn a contract award based upon an alleged
94
organizational conflict of interest (OCI). “The trial court found
86. Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: The Implied Contract to Fairly and Honestly Consider an
Offer, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 27, at 85 (June 2010).
87. 595 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
88. Id. at 1284.
89. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.101(a) (2008) (“[C]ontracting officers shall promote and
provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government
contracts.”).
90. Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc., 595 F.3d at 1288. The appellate court also, as a
matter of fact, found “no support for [the] argument that DHS’s requirements
constitute a pretextual attempt to circumvent the trial court’s earlier injunction and
procure an Oracle-based system.” Id.
91. Id. at 1286.
92. Id. at 1287.
93. 614 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
94. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2008) (“Organizational conflict of interest means that because
of other activities or relationships with other persons, a person is unable or
potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the Government, or the
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that the integrity of the procurement was not compromised[,]” and
the appellate court agreed. The court showed sufficient deference,
explaining that it would “not overturn a contracting officer’s
determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary
96
to law.” But even that deference was unnecessary, to the extent that
the court concluded that “the contracting officer fully complied with
the FAR requirements . . . [,] timely identified and evaluated any
potential conflicts . . . [,] pursued a number of steps to resolve any
potential conflicts, . . . [and] also completed an additional and
97
comprehensive conflicts investigation[.]”
I do not mean to suggest this particular case also was uninteresting,
but I sense that, this year, most practitioners will be far more
interested in the potentially dramatic ongoing regulatory
developments involving OCI’s. Late in the year, the Department of
Defense (DoD) issued a final rule on organizational conflicts of
interest in major defense acquisition programs, pursuant to the
98
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA). The
parallel efforts of the FAR Council and DoD and how they eventually
99
Moreover, the
are reconciled should be interesting to watch.
person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be otherwise
impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.”); see also 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.5
(addressing organizational conflicts of interest); Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational
Conflicts of Interest: A Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 25–26 (2005)
(broadly discussing organizational conflicts of interest in the global context).
95. Pai Corp., 614 F.3d at 1349.
[T]he [CO] determined that, although [competitors] had access to nonpublic information through their existing contracts, such information had
no competitive value in the present procurement. The [CO] also found
that, with respect to ITP, the information to which it had access involved
constantly changing requirements, was quickly outdated, and was therefore
of little value.
Id. at 1350.
96. Id. at 1352.
97. Id. at 1353.
98. See Final Rule, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement;
Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Major Defense Acquisition Programs,
75 Fed. Reg. 81908 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 209 and 252)
(explaining that the law “allows DoD to establish such limited exceptions as are
necessary to ensure that DoD has continued access to advice on systems architecture
and systems engineering matters from highly qualified contractors, while also
ensuring that such advice comes from sources that are objective and unbiased.”);
see also Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-23 §
207, 123 Stat. 1704, 1728–30 (2009) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 101) (outlining
organizational conflicts of interest in major defense acquisition programs).
99. While the proposed Defense Department rule would have applied sweeping
new OCI rules government-wide, and would have recast OCI issues as matters of
contractor integrity (in the Defense Department supplement to FAR Part 3) rather
than contractor qualification (FAR Part 9)—a relatively radical change—the final
rule took a more conservative approach, and confined the new rule to major Defense
Department acquisitions and Part 3 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement. The prefatory language to the final DFARS rule clarifies that “because
the FAR proposed rule has not yet been published, and because the decision has
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promulgation of the new rules likely will not come soon enough to
stem the “flurry of Government Accountability Office protests this
100
year on organizational conflicts of interest.”
B. Post-Award Contract Administration and Contract Performance
Turning to the world of post-award government contract
management and disputes, many observers found Precision Pine &
101
Timber v. United States to be problematic. The Forest Services’
timber contracts are unique, and the 1993 listing of the Mexican
spotted owl as an endangered species threw quite a wrench into the
102
works. Among other things, significant contractual delays resulted.
The procedural history of the case is complex due, in part, to (1) the
distinction between the individual timber contracts and the Forest
Service’s land management documents (or Land Resource
Management Plans (LRMPs)) and (2) proceedings in the U.S.
103
District Court of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Briefly, however, the court faced two issues: “whether clause CT 6.25
of the timber contracts create[d] an express warranty; [and] whether
the government breached the implied duty of good faith and fair
104
dealing.”
The Federal Circuit read the contractual language,
determined its plain meaning, and came to a conclusion different
105
from the trial court.
The court concluded that “CT 6.25 did not
create an express warranty and the Forest Service did not breach its
106
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Other commentators
have attempted to explain the difference in approach between the
trial and appellate court:
been made to limit this rule to implementation of OCIs in [major defense
acquisition programs (MDAPs)] . . . this final rule has been located primarily in
[DFARS] subpart 209.5, until such time as the FAR coverage on OCIs may be
relocated.” Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Organizational
Conflicts of Interest in Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 81908,
81910 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 209 and 252).
100. Ralph C. Nash, Postscript IV: Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 24 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 25, at 76 (May 2010) (“[S]ince the FAR is obsolete, the rules of the
game have to be learned from the litigated cases.”).
101. 596 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
102. Id. at 819–20. Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Forest Service
was required to consult with U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to ensure that no
action would “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species . . . or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
103. See Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 821–24 (discussing, inter alia, Pac. Rivers
Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) and Silver v. Babbitt, 924 F. Supp.
976 (D. Ariz. 1995)).
104. Id. at 824.
105. Id. at 826.
106. Id. at 834. Among other things, Precision Pine was not entitled to a
“guarantee of uninterrupted performance.” Id. at 831.
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The COFC construed [the relevant contract clause,] CT 6.25 as
creating an express warranty that the Forest Service had analyzed
reasonably available information and identified special measures
that it knew or should have known about that were necessary to
comply with the [Endangered Species Act or] ESA. The COFC
held that the Forest Service breached this warranty by failing to
consult formally on the forest management plans after the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Pac. Rivers. Because the Forest Service did not
follow ESA procedures, the COFC said the Forest Service had no
reasonable basis to know whether the measures identified in the
contract were adequate.
The Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of CT 6.25
because the plain language of the clause did not guarantee that the
Forest Service would follow a particular procedure or statutory
requirement in devising the protective measures listed in CT 6.25.
Although the clause referred to the ESA, that reference merely
explained the source of the special measures and did not impose
107
obligations on the Forest Service . . . .

In so doing, the court appears to be breaking new ground, raising
the bar, and setting forth:
a new standard for establishing a breach of the Government’s duty
to cooperate and not to hinder where the alleged breach is based
on Government delay. Before Precision Pine, most cases addressing
such allegations focused on whether the Government’s delay was
objectively unreasonable. Precision Pine, by contrast, appears to
require something more akin to bad faith—evidence that the
Government engaged in action “specifically targeted” at the other
party, and that this action attempts to reappropriate a benefit
108
guaranteed by the contract.

At least one other observer questioned whether the court found illconceived linkages between disparate types of unique government
contracts, specifically those dealing with savings and loan institutions
and those involving timber sales. “The . . . court believes that all
Government contracts are the same . . . [and] that it can state a
generic rule of contract law that applies to all types of contracts. We

107. Daniel P. Graham, Tara L. Ward & Craig Smith, Feature Comment: Fed. Cir.
Resets Standard for Breach of the Duty to Cooperate and Not to Hinder, 52 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 97, Mar. 18, 2010, at 3–4.
108. Id. at 1. The comment also asserts that: “First, the Court’s newly articulated
standard appears inconsistent with precedent[,] . . . [S]econd, the Precision Pine panel
decision departs from well-established and widely cited common law principles.
Restatement 205 comment (d), cited in Precision Pine, states that a party to a contract
violates its duty of good faith and fair dealing (of which the duty to cooperate and
not to hinder is a part) if that party unreasonably acts or fails to act . . . [, and]
[f]inally, neither party briefed or argued for the standard adopted by the Precision
Pine panel. Id. at 5–6.
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don’t believe this is sound reasoning, and it is particularly troubling
109
when such concepts are imported into procurement contracts.”
I share the concern that conventional FAR-based procurement
contracts are poor analogues to the court’s S&L and timber
experiences. I also agree that the government routinely benefits
from the implicit understandings that animate these contracts.
Indeed, I share the concern that, if taken to its logical conclusion and
applied broadly, Precision Pine could encourage contractors to offer
less favorable pricing to its government customers, as contractors
engage in risk-averse behavior and increase their pricing to account
for, or insure against, the government’s license to engage in
uncooperative behavior. That would be a tragic result.
Contractors selling supplies and services to the Government have
traditionally priced such supplies and services on the basis that the
law will protect them from unreasonable conduct by the
Government during the performance of the conduct. This belief
has been fostered by decades of decisions by the boards of contract
appeals and the courts granting equitable adjustments, price
adjustments, or damages when the Government does not meet this
reasonableness standard. The Government has been the major
beneficiary of this traditional view in that, while it has occasionally
been required to pay additional compensation to a contractor, it
has obtained lower prices on many, if not most, of its
procurements.
Perhaps the court is right in raising the standard with regard to
savings and loan institutions and buyers of timber. The savings and
loan litigation is all in the past tense[,] and the fact that the
Government will get a lower price for its timber probably will not
have a great effect on the treasury. But higher prices on the $500
billion worth of procurement contracts that are awarded each year
are a serious matter. We desperately need the court to think
through the impact of these generic rules that it is formulating and
give assurance to contractors selling supplies and services to the
Government that they can expect reasonable performance by the
110
agency with which they deal.
111

On a more positive note, in Donley v. Lockheed Martin, the Federal
Circuit appears to have rendered a relatively routine Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS) opinion. One senses, however, that this opinion’s
brevity may mask its impact in light of a two current trends: (1) the
government-wide effort to make the government more transparent
109. Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 22, at 67–68 (May 2010).
110. Id.
111. 608 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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and (2) mounting tension between the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) and its constituents.
Judge Bryson explained that this case derived from the “rephasing”
of the 1991 contract between Lockheed Martin and the Air Force for
112
the development of F-22 aircraft. Not long after the contract award,
both parties faced impediments. “In 1992, the Air Force informed
Lockheed that it anticipated a funding shortfall for the F-22 program.
At the same time, Lockheed told the Air Force that it expected the
113
costs of the F-22 project to increase.”
The Air Force approached
Lockheed Martin about rephasing the contract and sought estimates
based on, among other things, deleting two aircraft and addressing
certain weight related challenges. Later in the year, the government
modified the contract to mandate the rephasing.
Concurrent with this effort, the Air Force encouraged Lockheed
Martin (and certain other contractors) to alter its (and their) cost
accounting practices. Specifically, “the government urged Lockheed
to change its accounting practices and directly charge certain
114
personnel costs to the F-22 contract.”
After voicing concern,
Lockheed Martin agreed to do so. The changes to accounting
practices were not insignificant. Lockheed Martin estimated, at the
time, that they would exceed $10 million.
A number of years later, the DCAA “concluded that the change in
Lockheed’s accounting practices caused a significant increase in the
115
cost to the United States of the F-22 contract.”
In 2002, a new
contracting officer agreed with DCAA and issued a decision asserting
a government claim of approximately $14.7 million.
The
government, however, failed to convince either the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or the Federal Circuit that there
was a change in accounting practice that increased the price on an
116
“affected contract.” Rather, “the parties created a wholly new cost
117
estimate[.]”
112. Id. at 1354.
113. Id. at 1350.
114. Id. at 1351.
115. Id. at 1352.
116. Id. at 1354 (“The critical inquiry under the FAR provision that defines an
‘affected contract’ is not whether there is an entirely new contract; it is whether costs
were estimated under one accounting practice but reported under another. The
Board answered that factual question in the negative.”).
117. Id. at 1355; see, e.g., Terry L. Albertson & Linda S. Bruggeman, Feature
Comment: Donley v. Lockheed Martin Corp.: Only Contracts ‘Affected’ By Accounting
Change Are Subject To Price Adjustment, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 363 (Nov. 10, 2010)
(providing an in depth discussion of this issue). Mr. Albertson and Ms. Bruggeman
were counsel of record for Lockheed Martin for the ASBCA proceedings; Mr.
Albertson argued the case before the Federal Circuit. The authors suggest that
“[t]his is an important decision that interprets for the first time the meaning of
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Both the ASBCA and the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
ASBCA’s decision, approached this dispute as a matter in which the
new contracting officer basically rejected the pre-existing bargain
between the contracting parties. Neither the board of contract
appeals nor the appellate court would permit the government to
suggest that the original bargain between the contracting parties
failed due to a lack of authority on the part of the initial contracting
118
officer.
It seems reasonable to hope that, in the future, the case
serves as a good example of the benefits of transparent business
dealings.
[T]he government’s contention that Lockheed “did not disclose its
intent to remove the F-22 contract from the universe of CASaffected contracts” and “failed to fully disclose the effect of its
increased cost to the Government” is totally without merit. The
Board found, with considerable evidentiary support, that Lockheed
made the cost effects of its accounting changes clear to the Air
Force negotiators and that they understood the effects of those
119
changes.

The Obama administration has maintained its commitment to
120
and the contractor community—for legitimate
transparency,
reasons—views many of the transparency related initiatives with fear
121
and skepticism. But transparency—at least sometimes—can benefit
‘affected’ contract, and which could also determine whether price adjustments must
be made in other circumstances.” Id. at 3.
118. As the ASBCA explained:
“We conclude that CAS administration
requirements do not supersede or permit restructuring of the results of the parties’
arms length price negotiations conducted by the Air Force with full knowledge and
integration of the changed practices. The PCO had authority to negotiate the
rephrased contract price.” Appeal of Lockheed Martin Corporation, ASBCA No.
53822, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33,614 at 21.
119. Donley, 608 F.3d at 1355.
120. “My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of
openness in Government.” Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies: Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 26,
2009); see also Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:
Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,683 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“A democracy
requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency. As Justice Louis
Brandeis wrote, ‘sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.’”).
121. See, e.g., The Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information
System, PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, available at
http://www.ppirs.gov/fapiis.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (describing FAPIIS as
“an information system that contains specific information on the integrity and
performance of covered Federal agency contractors and grantees”); see also New Law
Requires Public Posting Of Contractor Responsibility Data, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 281,
Aug. 18, 2010, at 7 (stating that “[t]he Professional Services Council warns that
publicly releasing FAPIIS [contractor qualification and misconduct] data could
create ‘a politically motivated blacklist of vendors and improperly limit the
Government’s ability to access the best qualified vendors in the marketplace’”);
Gloria Sochon, Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS):
Spotlight on Contractor Responsibility, CONT. MGMT. 36, 39–40 (Jan. 2011) (describing
the types of information that must be reported to FAPIIS).
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the contractor in dealing with its government customer. For that
reason, it is heartening to see the Federal Circuit affirm the fact
122
findings of the ASBCA.
The case should also interest both contractors and agency
personnel frustrated with their current business relationship with
123
DCAA.
Expressing a sense of déjà vu earlier this year, Vern
Edwards referred to the Arthur Anderson report that accompanied
the 1986 Packard Commission Report, which, twenty five years later,
seems eerily current.
Deterioration of the contracting officer’s authority as the
government’s team leader together with an apparent increase in
DCAA’s authority appears to be a principal cause of the duplication
and inefficiency in the audit and oversight process. There is a
perception among contractors that DCAA is marching to its own drummer,
who may or may not be playing the same tune as the rest of the
government. . . . Contractors believe that the practical . . . result . . .
has been a change in the role of DCAA auditor from adviser to
decision maker and negotiator. In this latter role, contractors see
DCAA as generally inflexible and [Administrative Contracting
Officers] as reluctant to take a position contrary to DCAA because
of concern about being subjected to criticism. The net effect of this
situation is a procurement environment fraught with indecision, delays,
and unnecessary and costly disputes.
. . . [A]t times, contracting officers simply find it easier to “go
along” with DCAA than to challenge the auditor’s position. This is
precisely the perception that many contractors have of the
contracting officer in today’s environment.
....
. . . [A DCAA representative responded that DCAA] should be
under no constraint as to what it can say or challenge. . . . DCAA’s
purpose is not to support the [contracting officer]’s procurement
objectives, but rather to protect the taxpayers’ dollars. . . . [H]e
sees DCAA as having to be “independent” from both contractors
and contracting officers. . . . [I]t is not difficult to see how internal
disagreements, “turf battles,” and lack of communication can occur, and

122. Indeed, as a general rule, CAS cases seem like a particularly logical place for
the Federal Circuit to defer to both the finder of fact and the board judges’ superior
expertise and familiarity with this regime.
123. See, e.g., Vernon J. Edwards, Reliving History: The New DOD Policy On Resolution
Of Contract Audit Recommendations, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 3, at 11 (Jan. 2010)
(discussing, among other things, a 1984 Cuneo Lecture at the Army Judge Advocate
General’s School, in which Lockheed’s John Cavanaugh said: “Industry reaction has
been that in effect the contracting officer is being required to share his authority
with government auditors, who in the past have had an advisory role”).
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how this can lead to the lack of coordination and efficiency in the audit and
124
oversight process experienced by the contractors . . . .

History repeats itself. Edwards opines that: “Taken individually,
these limitations on [contracting officer] authority and increases of
auditor authority may be unobjectionable. However, in today’s
environment, and when considered in their totality, they appear to
have a significant chilling effect on [contracting officer’s]
performance of their duty to personally and independently issue final
125
decisions on contractors’ claims.”
Returning to the cases, I also struggled with M. Maropakis Carpentry,
126
127
Inc. v. United States, one of the court’s most formalistic decisions.
As discussed below, I was not alone.
Maropakis completed the contract, for roof and window
replacement, more than a year late. Maropakis put forward a
number of alleged excuses or justifications for its delayed
performance, including the inability to locate a window manufacturer
and the search for a metal fabricator, the need to re-submit plans, the
discovery of lead based paint, and the Navy’s prohibition of the use of
128
asphalt as a roofing adhesive.
The contracting officer responded
“that Maropakis did not ‘present[ ] sufficient justification to warrant
129
the time extension’ requested.”
Subsequently, the contracting
officer noted Maropakis’ failure to respond to that letter or request a
130
The contracting officer also
contracting officer’s final decision.
reminded Maropakis that the contract’s liquidated damages clause
entitled the government to recover $650 from Maropakis for each day
131
after the passage of the modified delivery date. After an additional
exchange of correspondence, the contracting officer rendered a
decision demanding approximately $300,000 in liquidated
132
damages.
124. THE PRESIDENT’S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, Conduct
and Accountability: A Report to the President, app. D at 135–36 (June 1986) (emphasis
added).
125. Edwards, Reliving History, supra note 123, at 12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Role of the Auditor: Any Room Left for the Contracting
Officer?,
1 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 66 (1987)); see also Thomas P. Barletta & William T. Keevan,
Feature Comment: Legal, Accounting and Practical Considerations in Responding to DCAA
Audits of Contractor Internal Controls Systems, 33 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 298,
Sept. 1, 2010, at 8 (“DCAA’s recent guidance on audits of contractor internal
controls presents a number of issues and potential risks for contractors . . . .”).
126. 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
127. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 3, at 773–75 (discussing “formalism”).
128. Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1325–26.
129. Id. at 1326 (omission in original).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1325–26 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.211–12).
132. Id. at 1326.
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The court
Maropakis sued in the Court of Federal Claims.
eventually dismissed Maropakis’ claim for time extensions and
granted summary judgment in favor of the government on the
134
liquidated damages.
On appeal, among other things, Maropakis
asserted “that it was not required to comply with the jurisdictional
prerequisites of the [Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA)] to assert
its claim for a time extension as a defense to the government’s
135
counterclaim for liquidated damages.”
With regard to its claim for time extensions, the majority
concluded that “there is nothing in the CDA that excuses contractor
136
compliance with the explicit CDA claim requirements.”
Accordingly, the majority held that the trial court “correctly dismissed
137
Maropakis’s breach of contract claim for lack of jurisdiction.”
Similarly, with regard to the liquidated damages, the majority held
that “the Court of Federal Claims correctly required Maropakis to
comply with the CDA requirements notwithstanding Maropakis’s
138
styling of its claim as a defense to a government counterclaim[.]”
The majority explained:
The statutory language of the CDA is explicit in requiring a
contractor to make a valid claim to the contracting officer prior to
litigating that claim. The purpose of this requirement is to
encourage the resolution of disagreements at the contracting
officer level thereby saving both parties the expense of
litigation. . . . Maropakis does not point to any authority that
provides an exception to the CDA claim requirements when a
contractor’s claim for contract modification is made in defense to a
government claim. And we see no reason to create such an
exception. Thus, we hold that a contractor seeking an adjustment of
contract terms must meet the jurisdictional requirements and procedural
prerequisites of the CDA, whether asserting the claim against the
government as an affirmative claim or as a defense to a government
139
action.

What is particularly striking is that no one disputed the COFC’s
jurisdiction. The court conceded that: (1) the Court of Federal
Claims had jurisdiction over both Maropakis’s claim relating to the
liquidated damages and the government’s counterclaim by the
government; and (2) both parties agreed that certification was
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1326–27.
135. Id. at 1327.
136. Id. at 1329.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1331.
139. Id. at 1331 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see 48 C.F.R.
§ 33.204; see also Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

2011]

2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS

1097

unnecessary for the liquidated damages claim; the contracting
140
officer’s final decision on that issue was proper.
Accordingly, in light of the discussion, above, it is only fitting that
Judge Newman dissented, vigorously, in this case.
The issue here is not whether Maropakis perfected a monetary
claim of its own, but whether Maropakis is to be permitted to
defend against the government’s claim. No rule or precedent
holds that a contractor forfeits its right of defense if it does not file
its own claim. And the court is misguided in its ruling that the
government’s claim for damages cannot be defended against unless
the contractor first undertakes the formal procedures of contract
modification. . . .
The right to defend against an adverse claim is not a matter of
141
“jurisdiction,” nor of grace; it is a matter of right.
142

Like many commentators, I find myself aligned with the dissent.
Historically, there seems no debate that the government’s demand
for liquidated damages is, well, a government claim. Accordingly,
familiarity with the CDA leads me to agree with the assertion –
indeed, I find it seemingly axiomatic – that “a defense to a
government claim is not a request for a contract modification—it is
143
simply a defense and nothing more.”
Prior decisions of both the [BCA’s] and the COFC’s predecessor
courts have discussed the difference between a contractor’s
affirmative CDA claims arising out of or relating to the contract to
combat a liquidated damages assessment versus a contractor’s
defenses against an assessment through an attack of its factual
underpinnings. The key to understanding this distinction is in the
form of relief requested. An affirmative CDA claim is an attempt to
modify or adjust the contract to counter the liquidated damages
assessment (e.g., compensable time extensions as a result of
government delays). A factual defense to a liquidated damages
assessment merely serves to attack the assessment itself (e.g., the
government’s assessment was incorrect because the delay was
excused as a result of government delays). Plainly stated, a CDA
claim seeks affirmative relief under the contract through a contract

140. Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1330.
141. Id. at 1334-35.
142. Daniel Seiden, Federal Circuit Says Valid CDA Claim Needed for Jurisdiction to
Defend Government Claim, 93 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 441 (2010) (citing senior bar
members’ reactions, including: “It is shocking that the court would ascribe to
Congress such a bizarre and unjust intent in enacting the Contract Disputes Act”;
“An unfair formalism creating obstacles to a just result is bad enough, but this is
appalling”; and describing the decision as “another dismaying performance by the
Federal Circuit”).
143. Id. (citing interview with John Pachter).
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adjustment; a factual defense only attempts to reduce or eliminate
144
the liquidated damages assessment.

Despite any confusion that arose leading up to the litigation, “the
bottom line still should be that there is a difference between an
affirmative claim for costs due to a government delay versus a factual
defense that the government’s actions delayed the contract resulting
145
in an improper liquidated damages assessment.”
It is difficult to conceive of a more bizarre holding than this rule
that if a defense looks like an affirmative claim, it can only be
asserted if it meets the standard of being a proper CDA claim. We
can find nothing in the CDA that would lead to this conclusion and
it surely flies in the face of the congressional purpose of providing
contractors a fair procedure for resolving disputes. We never had
any problem with the holding in Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Associates v.
U.S., 3 Cl. Ct. 217 (1983), that precludes interest on a Government
claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim. However, it is
far stretch to hold that a contractor cannot even assert a defense to
a Government claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim.
We agree with the dissent that this decision is “an affront to the
146
principles upon which these courts were founded.”

I doubt that Maropakis will prove to be the Federal Circuit’s last
word on this issue.
Turning to terminations and breach, in McHugh v. DLT Solutions,
147
Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA). The most significant aspect of the
dispute is that the court agreed with the ASBCA that the government
properly terminated the contract for the convenience of the
government. “[T]he software was never deployed . . . [and] the
contracting officer returned all compact disks and software
148
documentation relating to the contract . . . .”
The unique aspect of the case was the breach claim, which the
ASBCA granted, but the appellate court rejected. Prior to the
termination, the parties modified the contract “to include a nonsubstitution clause that prevented [the government] from replacing
the leased Oracle software with functionally similar software for a

144. Raymond S.E. Pushkar & Justin M. Ganderson, Federal Circuit Contravenes
Purposes of CDA in Holding on Government Liquidated Damages Assessments, 94 FED. CONT.
REP. (BNA) 81 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
145. Id. (emphasis omitted).
146. Ralph C. Nash, Defense to a Government Claim is a Contractor Claim: A Weird
Thought, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 42, at 135 (Sept. 2010); see also CDA Procedures
Apply To Contractor Defense To Government Claim, Fed. Cir. Holds, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR
¶ 225 (June 30, 2010).
147. 618 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
148. Id. at 1377–78.
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period of one year after the expiration or termination of the
149
contract.”
After the termination, the contractor “alleged that the
government had breached the non-substitution clause of the contract
by replacing the . . . software with functionally equivalent . . .
150
software.”
Even acknowledging that the government did not use
the software, the ASBCA “reasoned that the non-substitution clause
was bargained-for consideration between the parties and was
binding. . . . [Accordingly, the government] breached the nonsubstitution clause in the contract and was liable for expectation
151
damages.”
The Federal Circuit rejected the ASBCA’s interpretation of the
contractual language. True to form, the court noted that “[c]ontract
interpretation begins with the plain language of the written
152
agreement” and reached for Webster’s Dictionary.
Finding that
“[t]he dictionary definition of the word ‘replace’ requires
substitution of one by another [or] . . . ‘to put something new in the
place of[,]’” the court found that the government’s use of pre153
existing applications did not amount to replacements.
The Federal Circuit addressed a long-simmering cost and pricing
154
issue in ATK Thiokol, Inc. v. United States.
The court affirmed the
155
holding that the Independent Research and
COFC decision
Development (IR&D) costs at issue had been properly allocated as
indirect costs under the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and the
156
FAR.
Even though the courts agreed on the outcome, “[t]he
157
Federal Circuit took a more traditional, legalistic approach.” Rarely
have the Federal Circuit’s forays into the CAS concluded as
158
efficiently. As the contractor’s advocates explained:
149. Id. at 1377.
150. Id. at 1378.
151. Id. at 1379. Given the ASBCA’s findings, the award of expectation damages
for breach of a government contract would be the correct, but nonetheless an
exceptional, remedy.
152. Id. at 1380. It is not my intent to suggest that this instance, alone, confirms
that the “court is wedded to dictionaries.” See, e.g., Nash, Implied Contract to Fairly and
Honestly Consider an Offer, supra note 86, at 85. Conversely, I am confident that at
least some readers will be interested to know that the court relied on the online
version of Webster’s.
153. McHugh, 618 F.3d at 1380.
154. 598 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
155. 68 Fed. Cl. 612 (2005), aff’d 598 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
156. Id. at 645.
157. Paul E. Pompeo, Practitioner’s Comment: Fed. Cir. Adopts Broad View of IR&D, 52
GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 129, Apr. 7, 2010, at 12–13 also opining that the “decision
should not be tallied as a ‘win for contractors’—it benefits both contractors and the
Government”).
158. No doubt, however, the government must have been frustrated by how little
traction its arguments achieved. Nor does the court offer an explanation for the
more than four year period required for the appeal to be resolved.
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For the last four decades . . . there has been much debate
regarding when contractors can recover R&D costs as indirect
costs, or [IR&D] costs, spread over multiple contracts, as opposed
to direct costs of a single contract. This debate centers on the
regulatory requirement that R&D costs are recoverable as indirect
IR&D costs unless the R&D effort is “required in the performance
of a contract.”. . .
. . . [T]he court] held that R&D effort is only “required in the
performance of a contract” when the effort is specifically required
by a contract’s terms. . . .
. . . [This] should end much of the uncertainty . . . .
The . . . decision . . . provides added confidence to contractors that
their adherence to the terms of their [CAS] Disclosure Statements
will guide whether R&D costs are properly classified as indirect
costs under CAS 420 and are allowable under [FAR] 31.205-18.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit affirmed that contractors, within the broad
parameters established by the CAS, are free to adopt cost accounting
practices that make sense for their businesses and that, once established and
not otherwise non-compliant, bind the contractor and the government.
Finally, the . . . decision provides guidance on proper contractor
accounting for bid and proposal (B&P) costs, costs that are similar
159
to IR&D costs and governed by the same regulatory framework.

As a related aside, I was surprised, in September, by the passage on
IR&D costs contained in Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carters’
Better Buying Power memorandum, promoting his high-profile
160
efficiency and productivity initiative.
Carter reported that DoD
“reimburses industry as an allowable cost over $3 billion annually” in
161
IR&D.
The paltry sum was stunning. Carter suggested that “there is some
evidence that the defense industry has reduced its in-house
162
laboratory infrastructure to a point not envisioned in the 1990s[,]”
which seems particularly disturbing given the government’s currently
meager level of investment in path-breaking research and its future
prospects in light of the government’s dire fiscal condition.
159. Thomas A. Lemmer, et al., Maximizing Contractor Recovery of IR&D Costs:
Federal Circuit Affirms ATK Thiokol, 45 PROCUREMENT LAW., Summer 2010, at 27,
27–28 (emphasis added); see also Thomas A. Lemmer & Phillip R. Seckman, Federal
Circuit Provides Needed Clarity on Proper Classification of IR&D Costs, 93 FED. CONT. REP.
(BNA) 286 (2010) (summarizing ATK Thiokol).
160. See Memorandum from Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Professionals, Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (Sept. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD_ATL_Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_FI
NAL.PDF.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Id.
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Moreover, it was also intriguing to read Carter’s perspective on
limited visibility into contractor’s “independent” efforts, particularly
as he bemoaned that DOD lacks “insight into how or where these
funds go or if they benefit the Department or promote the
163
technological prowess of our industry.” As is the case with many of
these initiatives, it will be fascinating to learn, over time, which
reforms, if any, take hold at DoD.
C. Winstar Cases
164

In Holland v. United States, the court noted that this was one of the
165
last in a long line of cases which stemmed from the Supreme
166
Court’s decision in United States v. Winstar Corp. Winstar, of course,
opened the door for certain financial institutions to recover damages
when the government, by legislation, in effect broke its promises to
allow the plaintiffs to use special accounting methods to salvage failed
167
thrifts.
While that long procession of cases may be drawing to a
close, the precedents that flowed from those cases—including
Holland—are likely to echo for many years to come. It remains a
matter of some debate, of course, what impact these cases will have—
168
in the short or the long-term—on traditional government contracts.
In Holland, the court reversed a 2008 decision of the Court of
Federal Claims, in which the trial court held the government liable
169
for $18 million in damages.
Plaintiffs, investors that had acquired
163. Id.
164. 621 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
165. Id. at 1373.
166. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
167. Id. at 909–10. See generally Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/
(last updated Dec. 20, 2002) (summarizing key events in the Savings and Loan
Crisis).
168. See, e.g., Michael R. Rizzo & Virginia M. Gomez, Erosion of the Sovereign Acts
Doctrine? How Recent Winstar and Spent Nuclear Fuel Litigation Impacts Government
Contractors, 42 PROCUREMENT LAW., Spring 2007, at 3 suggesting that: “Contractors
should keep in mind that (1) the courts are inclined to review this new generation of
breach of contract claims on a case-by-case basis and to construe strictly the terms
and circumstances of the particular contract, and some judges and courts still look
for exceptions to shield the Government from large damage awards; (2) the
Government will undoubtedly attempt to insert risk-shifting or non-liability
provisions into contracts that expressly protect it from the consequences of
regulatory or statutory change; and, as a result, (3) contractors that decide to bring
breach of contract claims arising out of regulatory or legislative changes that alter
the Government’s existing contractual obligations should be prepared for potentially
long and expensive litigation.”; see also Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the Sovereign
Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 1177, 1179 (2000) (arguing that Winstar has not “effected any radical change in
the law respecting the liability of the United States for retroactive legislation affecting
the government’s contractual undertakings”).
169. Holland v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 681, 699 (2009), rev’d 621 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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failing thrifts under assistance agreements with the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), claimed (as is the norm in
the Winstar cases) that those agreements were breached by Congress’
enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which erased many of the
regulatory benefits previously agreed to by the FSLIC under the
170
assistance agreements. The government argued, however, that the
plaintiffs’ claims had been erased by a settlement agreement that the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) entered into with
171
certain involved parties.
Under that settlement agreement, the
FDIC agreed, inter alia, to pay $3.3 million in financial assistance as
“full satisfaction of any and all remaining payments or contributions
172
due or to become due under the Assistance Agreements.”
173
Noting that the case presented an “unusual factual situation,” the
Federal Circuit relied narrowly on Illinois law (the law governing the
174
settlement agreement) to conclude that “Plaintiffs’ release of all
claims against the FDIC . . . in the Settlement Agreement also
effected a release of all claims against its co-obligor, the [Office of
175
Thrift Supervision].”
Because the settlement agreement did not
explicitly exclude the regulatory promises that had earlier been made
to plaintiffs, the Federal Circuit held that the settlement agreement
covered the government’s obligations under those regulatory
176
promises, as well.
On its face, the decision is highly fact-specific, and arguably may be
limited to the unique circumstances of the Holland case. It is
possible, however, that the Holland decision may have a broader
impact. In the coming years, as budgetary pressures grow, federal
agencies will be more likely to rely upon private capital and
177
investment to accomplish public objectives and missions.
In
170. Id. at 687.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 686.
173. Holland, 621 F.3d at 1373–74.
174. Id. at 1383 (“Neither party has pointed to any ‘controlling federal law’ on the
effect of an accord and satisfaction with one co-obligor on other co-obligors. Thus,
pursuant to the choice-of-law provision of the Settlement Agreement, we will analyze
the issue under Illinois law.”).
175. Id. at 1384; see also id. at 1377–78 (clarifying that “release and accord and
satisfaction are distinct contractual defenses[,]” but concluding, nonetheless, that
“an agreement may constitute both a release and an accord and satisfaction, either of
which may bar future claims”).
176. Id. at 1383.
177. I fervently hope that the modern-era financial crisis and the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) will not spawn a comparable generation of litigation. See,
e.g., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT EXAMINING
TREASURY’S USE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTRACTING AUTHORITY (Oct. 14, 2010),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-101410-report.pdf. One familiar
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resolving problems that arise under those increasingly complicated
arrangements, which are likely to span multiple agencies, private
parties will have to be careful not to surrender too much in
settlements with individual agencies. In light of Holland, it will be
important to exclude other potential claims, against other agencies,
in any settlement with an individual agency.
178
Anchor Savings Bank v. United States is another of the vanishing
breed of Winstar cases. The plaintiff bank had been forced to sell a
valuable asset, a mortgage banking company, as a result of the capital
shortfall when its regulatory agreements with the government were
179
undermined by the FIRREA legislation.
Plaintiff sought damages,
including lost profits, for that divestiture. After a long trial, the Court
of Federal Claims awarded plaintiffs approximately $382 million in
180
damages, including, in part, lost profits.
On appeal, the Federal
Circuit held that lost profits are, under certain circumstances,
recoverable from the government, so long as (1) the lost profits were
reasonably foreseeable, (2) the loss of profits was caused by the
government’s breach, and (3) the amount of the lost profits has been
181
established with reasonable certainty.
The government argued that Anchor’s purchase and then forced
sale of the asset were not reasonably foreseeable by the government,
182
and so the damages were not recoverable.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed, however, and held that the trial court had
refrain voiced by the Congressional Oversight Panel resonated with me: “Initially,
Treasury did not have enough trained [contracting officer’s technical representatives
(COTRs)] to manage the contracts, so it assigned a number of its senior officials as
COTRs. Given the limited timeframe for executing the program, some of these
officials were assigned COTR responsibilities without receiving formal training in
their acquisition-related responsibilities. While Treasury replaced the senior-level
COTRs with certified COTRs over time, the fact that officials without proper
procurement training were charged with the administration and monitoring of
contracts for a time potentially impeded efforts to implement effectively and oversee
the TARP.” Id. at 44. The federal government’s consistent failure to staff the
contract administration function is as well documented as it depressing. See, e.g.,
Schooner & Greenspahn, supra note 63, at 16; Steven L. Schooner, Contractor
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced
Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 557 (2005) (noting that “[l]ack of training
was not only evident on the side of the contractors. Military personnel themselves
did not have the necessary training in the area of contract administration to
adequately monitor and oversee the contracts”).
178. 597 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
179. Id. at 1359–60.
180. Anchor Sav. Bank v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 1, 153 (2008) (the damages
decision on appeal), aff’d in part and remanded in part 597 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
see also Anchor Sav. Bank v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 406, 421 (2002) (the preceding
liability decision).
181. Anchor Sav. Bank, 597 F.3d at 1361 (citing authorities). Each of these
inquiries, the Federal Circuit noted, “presents a question of fact as to which we
exercise ‘clear error’ review.’” Id.
182. Id. at 1630.
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properly required only a general showing that (1) the government
could reasonably have foreseen that the influx of supervisory
goodwill under [the regulatory agreements] would cause the . . .
institution to make investments in order to generate profit and
rehabilitate the failing acquired thrifts; and (2) the government
could reasonably have foreseen that a breach of contract would
cause the acquiring institution to sell off those very investments in
183
order to raise capital to meet the regulatory requirements.

Under this more expansive test, the court held that the trial court did
not commit clear error in finding that Anchor’s loss was
184
foreseeable.
The ability of Winstar plaintiffs to recover lost profits differs
185
markedly from traditional government contracts cases. The court’s
introduction to its damages analysis describes a familiar common-law
solution, but one that, for most part, is divorced from federal
government contracting remedies. “Damages for breach of contract
are designed to make the non-breaching party whole. One way to
accomplish that objective is to award ‘expectancy damages,’ i.e., the
benefits the non-breaching party would have expected to receive had
the breach not occurred. Expectancy damages ‘are often equated
with lost profits, although they can include other damage elements as
186
well.’”
Under traditional federal contracting cases, which typically arise
out of lengthy, specific, standardized federal procurement contracts,
the courts and the boards have been reluctant to allow lost profits
because damages under those contracts are typically defined by
heavily regulated and closely drafted remedy-granting clauses.
Indeed, the government’s extensive use of remedy-granting clauses
causes what the common-law would deem breaches to remain within
187
the contract’s remedial scheme.
The contrast between the more
183. Id. at 1363 (rejecting the government’s attempt to draw a more stringent
foreseeability test from Federal Circuit case law).
184. Id. at 1364.
185. See, e.g., Rodger D. Citron, Lessons From the Damages Decisions Following United
States v. Winstar Corp., 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 32 (2002) (interpreting the courts’
traditional refusal to asses expectancy damages against the government as a vestige of
the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity); Jon W. Burd, Note, Where the Rabbit Hole
Ends: A Working Model For Measuring Winstar-Type Damages in the Federal Circuit, 13
FED. CIR. B.J. 657, 673 (2004) (explaining that expectancy damages, while
commonplace in run of the mill contract cases, remain novel in the government
contracts context).
186. Anchor Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 597 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citing Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (recounting blackletter law concerning the basis for expectancy damages)).
187. It is easy to contrast the government’s typical remedy-granting clause regime:
[P]arties to government contracts use standardized remedy-granting
clauses to allocate the risk of anticipated and unforeseen contingencies
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expansive Winstar damages and the traditional presumption against
lost profits under government contracts suggests that, as the
government embarks on more complex commercial arrangements in
the future, the government may attempt, by contract, to limit the
remedies available to exclude the recovery of expectancy damages by
the private parties potentially injured by government actions.
D. Spent Nuclear Fuel
Arguably the most intriguing case of the year, Nebraska Public Power
District v. United States, not only involved a dozen Federal Circuit
judges, but also pitted the exclusivity of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims against the generalist federal courts. Of course, it also
188
involves the long-running Spent Nuclear Fuel saga.
The delays
between the parties. The implicit premise of these clauses is that they (1)
dissuade contractors from padding their bids, offers, or proposals when
competing for government business, and (2) reassure those contractors that
the government will equitably adjust contracts to reimburse for unforeseen
contingencies. This “contingency promise” essentially provides that in
exchange for the contractor’s willingness not to inflate its contract price to
insulate itself against certain potential, although unknown, liabilities, the
government agrees to make the contractor whole when such liabilities are
incurred.
During the performance of government contracts, if an unanticipated
contingency arises that requires the contractor to incur additional costs, the
parties have a number of options. The contracting officer and the
contractor can agree upon compensation and bilaterally modify their
contract. Alternatively, the contracting officer can unilaterally determine
the additional compensation to be paid. If the contractor is dissatisfied with
the amount of compensation, it can file a claim, which commences the
disputes process.
Steven L. Schooner & Erin Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction Liability: Exposing
the Inferior Risk-Bearer, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 319–20 (2006).
188. This brief coverage, of course, cannot do justice to this topic, but recent
commentary builds upon a rich source of analysis. See generally Marta Adams, Yucca
Mountain-Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 423 (2010) (evincing typical NIMBY
enthusiasm for the political derailment of the Yucca Mountain project); Thomas B.
Cochran & Geoffrey H. Fettus, Response: NRDC’s Perspective on the Nuclear Waste
Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10791, 10792 (2010) (staking out the stark position that
“the process of developing, licensing, and setting environmental and oversight
standards for the proposed repository were repeatedly rigged or dramatically
weakened to ensure the licensing of the proposed site rather than to provide safety
for the length of time that the waste is dangerous”); Charles de Saillan, Disposal of
Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States and Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem,
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 461 (2010) (providing a broad survey of how the disposal
issue is handled internationally); David R. Hill, Response: The NWPA and the Realities of
our Current Situation, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10795 (2010) (taking the position that “while
[the statutory regime governing nuclear energy] may have significant problems and
difficulties, [it] is worth salvaging); Richard B. Stewart, Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste
Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10783 (2010) (cautioning that the primary lesson of the
Yucca Mountain boondoggle is that any future repository project must include “the
informed assent of the public and of host localities”); Daniel T. Swanson, Response:
NWPA Is Still a Viable Option for Solving the Nuclear Waste Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
10800 (2010) (arguing that there is still hope for Congress to create a permanent
repository under the current legislation). The last four sources are most readily
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associated with the construction and operation of the Yucca
Mountain nuclear fuel repository generated endless litigation
involving tens of billions of dollars of potential damages due under
the Energy Department’s Standard Contract. Still, I remain far more
troubled that, today, after two decades of study, construction, and, of
course, litigation, the federal government appears to have no viable
189
alternative solution on the horizon for this significant problem.
Recent events involving the state of Japan’s nuclear industry following
the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami serve as a potent reminder
190
of the stakes involved.
191
Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the United
States Department of Energy (DOE) entered into contracts—referred
to as the “Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste”—with nuclear power
producers, including Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), to
dispose of the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that the
192
producers’ power plants generated. The deal was relatively simple.
The nuclear power producers paid fees with the understanding that
DOE would begin picking up and disposing of the spent nuclear fuel
193
no later than January 31, 1998. The producers have paid their fees;
indeed, the court notes that the utilities pay $750 million into the
194
Despite DOE’s stated
spent nuclear fuel fund annually.
available via the Environmental Law Reporter’s online database at
http://www.elr.info/NewsAnalysis/nasearch.cfm.
189. “While DOE reaffirms its obligations to take possession and dispose of the
nation’s spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, the Secretary of Energy has
decided that a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is not a workable option for
long-term disposition of the materials.” U.S. Department of Energy Motion to
Withdraw, In re U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001 (N.R.C.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board March 3, 2010) (withdrawing application for a
license for a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain and noting that the Blue
Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future will undertake a review of
alternative solutions), available at
http://www.energy.gov/news/documents/DOE_Motion_to_Withdraw.pdf.
See generally Key Issues, Repository Development, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE,
http://www.nei.org/keyissues/nuclearwastedisposal/yuccamountain (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011); Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum-Blue Ribbon Commission on
America’s Nuclear Future (Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/presidential-memorandum-blue-ribbon-commission-americas-nuclearfuture, (“[T]he Nation’s approach, developed more than 20 years ago, to managing
materials derived from nuclear activities, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste,
has not proven effective.”).
190. Eric Niiler, Japanese Nuclear Crisis Boosts Interest in At Home Radiation
Monitoring, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/japanese-nuclear-crisis-boosts-interest-inat-home-radiation-monitoring/2011/03/21/ABS0DA8_story.html.
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006).
192. 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2010).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B).
194. NPPD II, 590 F.3d 1357, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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195

confidence, no spent nuclear fuel has been collected. DOE then
“took the position . . . that it did not have an unconditional
obligation under the statute or the Standard Contract to accept
nuclear waste by . . . 1998 . . . . [Rather,] the statutory deadline did
not apply if DOE did not have a facility available to accept nuclear
196
waste by that date.” Not surprisingly, litigation resulted, including
dozens of breach of contract actions commenced in the Court of
197
Federal Claims.
Many suits were filed elsewhere, and, in 1996, an important
development played out in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
198
Circuit. In Indiana Michigan Power District v. United States, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that DOE had an unconditional obligation under
199
the NWPA to accept spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998. Then,
200
in 1997, in Northern States Power Co. v. Department of Energy, the D.C.
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the DOE to proceed with
201
contractual remedies consistent with NWPA’s mandate. Intending
to leave no wiggle room, the D.C. Circuit specifically denied DOE the
ability to invoke the standard contract’s Unavoidable Delays clause.
As a result, DOE could no longer assert that it was not responsible for
damages that arose “out of causes beyond the control and without the
202
fault or negligence of the party failing to perform.”
Nearly a decade later, Court of Federal Claims Judge Francis
Allegra concluded that the D.C. Circuit had over-reached and that its
203
writ of mandamus was void.
To the extent that Judge Allegra’s
decision would have allowed DOE, once again, to invoke the
195. The court explained:
In response to questions about the remedies that would be available to
ensure that DOE would perform its contractual obligations in a timely
fashion, and in particular that it would meet the 1998 deadline, DOE stated,
“The 1998 date is called for in the Act, and we believe it to be a realistic date.
Our performance will be judged by meeting this date.” 48 Fed. Reg. at
16,598.
Id. at 1360.
196. Id. at 1361.
197. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States (NPPD I), 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 673 (2006),
rev’d, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
198. 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
199. Id. at 1277.
200. 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
201. Id. at 761.
202. Id. at 760 (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2010) (Article IX(A) of the contract,
entitled “Unavoidable Delays by Purchaser or DOE”)).
203. NPPD I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 674. The court admonished that
[a]ny notion that there is a meaningful distinction between interpreting a
statute or a regulation so as to control an agency’s interpretation of a
contract and interpreting the contract itself is belied by a legion of cases in
this circuit that have construed contracts originating in legislation passed by
Congress and done so by reference to the underlying statute.
Id. at 663.
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Unavoidable Delays clause as a defense, an interlocutory appeal was
taken to determine “whether the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Indiana
Michigan and Northern States are entitled to res judicata effect in the
204
The court heard
proceedings before the Court of Federal Claims.”
the case en banc and, in a decision written by Judge Bryson, reversed.
The Federal Circuit concluded that “the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in
the Indiana Michigan and Northern States cases were not barred by
sovereign immunity and should not have been denied res judicata
205
effect on that ground.”
The court systematically rejected the three rationales put forward
by the COFC.
First, based on the analysis of the D.C. Circuit in General Electric and
the decision of this court in PSEG Nuclear, L.L.C. v. United States,
465 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006), . . . section 119 of the NWPA
authorized the D.C. Circuit to review the utilities’ statutory claim
arising under section 302 of the Act. Second, . . . the ‘no adequate
remedy’ requirement in section 10(c) of the APA does not apply to
special statutory review provisions such as section 119 of the NWPA.
Section 10(c) of the APA therefore did not bar the D.C. Circuit
from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the scope of the
government’s obligations under section 302 of the NWPA and to
order appropriate relief to enforce those obligations. Finally, . . .
the D.C. Circuit’s decision construing section 302 of the NWPA,
and its order directing the government to act in accordance with
the utilities’ rights under that provision, did not improperly
intrude on the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to
206
address NPPD’s breach of contract claim.

The cadre of attorneys immersed in litigating spent nuclear fuel
cases no doubt have been intrigued by the appellate court’s lengthy
analysis of these issues. Most government contracts counsel, however,
will find them of little utility. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the D.C. Circuit did not usurp the COFC’s
prerogatives.
The D.C. Circuit’s order prohibited the government from using
contract interpretation as a means of avoiding its statutory
obligations under section 302, which the D.C. Circuit was
authorized to do as a means of enforcing the statutory claim that
was brought before it in the Indiana Michigan case. Beyond that
implementation of its statutory ruling, the D.C. Circuit properly left

204. NPPD II, 590 F.3d at 1363.
205. Id. at 1376.
206. Id. at 1364–65.
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all issues of contract breach, enforcement, and remedy to be
207
determined in the litigation before the Court of Federal Claims.

Judge Gajarsa dissented vigorously, arguing that the D.C. Circuit
interpreted the Standard Contract rather than the statute and, in so
doing “infringe[d] upon the Court of Federal Claims’s exclusive
Tucker Act jurisdiction over the administration of contract disputes,
thereby impacting the sovereign immunity of the United States and
undermining this court’s duty to review the contract decisions of the
208
Court of Federal Claims.”
Judge Gajarsa’s frustration with his
colleagues is clear, and he sees the majority’s lengthy opinion as no
more than a bow to the D.C. Circuit. He concludes: “I can
appreciate the majority’s attempt to avoid criticism of a sister court,
but the sheer mushy applesauce consistency of the majority opinion
in avoiding a jurisdictional confrontation with the D.C. Circuit should
209
be obvious.”
Judges Dyk and Linn, in a pithy concurrence, attempt to cabin
210
Judge Gajarsa’s “overreading” of the majority opinion.
The court appears to be unanimous in agreeing that the District
of Columbia Circuit had jurisdiction to interpret the statute, and
that the D.C. Circuit did not (and could not) address purely
remedial questions. . . . [C]ontrary to the dissent, I do not read
either the D.C. Circuit or the majority here as ordering the
government to pay money damages (expectancy damages) for
211
breach of the agreement.

At least one commentator read the Federal Circuit’s decision as
diminishing the role of the Court of Federal Claims and an invitation
to forum shop.
Rather than continuing to limit the reach of Bowen, however, the
court once more elevated form over substance to open a new front
in the assault on the jurisdiction of the [COFC]. The [Federal
Circuit’s] decision allows courts other than the [COFC] to
interpret contractual provisions whenever the construction of a
statute influences the outcome of the contractual issues.
Consequently, [this case] enhances the ability of plaintiffs to forum
shop while further diminishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the
212
[COFC].

207. Id. at 1365.
208. Id. at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1386–87.
210. Id. at 1376 (Dyk, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 1376–77.
212. Thies, supra note 32, at 1204 (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879
(1988)).
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This seems extreme. Dozens of spent nuclear fuel cases have now
percolated up through the Court of Federal Claims and Federal
Circuit for more than a decade. One trial judge analyzed the state of
play and saw the landscape differently from his colleagues. He laid
out his objections, supported them, and stood behind his principles.
The Federal Circuit properly chose to engage in the matter and,
given the significance of the issue, provided en banc review. A
surprising level of cohesion—favoring the pre-existing status quo—
developed. The court explained, at great length, its reasoning.
Moreover, though the trial court had gone so far as to postulate “that
the mandamus derivatively threatens the jurisdiction of the Federal
213
Circuit,” the Federal Circuit, with the exception of Judge Gajarsa,
did not share that concern. In sum, the system remained intact.
At no point did the Federal Circuit digress into hand-wringing over
the sad reality that surrounds the spent nuclear fuel cases. These
cases involve a large number of entities engaged in a sophisticated
business that is heavily regulated by the government.
The
government—for now a generation—has tied an entire industry’s
hands with regard to a solution to an immense, complicated
problem. The government mandated that private industry contribute
staggering sums to fund that mandated solution. The government
invested much time and energy in that solution, all the while brashly,
publicly, eschewing a fallback position. Through no fault of the
affected industry, the government’s solution stalled and,
subsequently, entirely derailed. The government does not wish to
reimburse the industry for its investment into the spent nuclear fuel
fund or the damages caused by the solution’s implosion. There is
little point in inquiring into whether those funds may be required to
fund the “next” solution. The courts must now resolve what, frankly,
remains a no-win situation. At least the nuclear industry, the
attorneys, and the courts are not headed back to square one.
CONCLUSION: A CONVERGENCE OF JUSTICE AND RISK ALLOCATION?
This article concludes with the admittedly unusual matter of
214
Agredano v. United States. Agredano’s inclusion here is not meant to
suggest this case is of significance to government contracts
practitioners. Rather, unlike most of the cases this year, it speaks
volumes of how some of the judges on the court view the modern
213. NPPD I, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 673–74 (2006) (explaining—or perhaps more
accurately, speculating—that if the Court of Federal Claims respected the D.C.
Circuit’s writ of mandamus, then the writ might be off-limits to the Federal Circuit
on appeal).
214. 595 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011).
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court’s role. As suggested above, it could offer an example of the
court’s preference for simple, formalistic solutions to complex
215
problems. But I sense I am not alone in reading this case as one in
which the court chose to cast itself as a gatekeeper and protector of
the public fisc rather than the last station at which some minimal
amount of fairness for those who do business with the government
will be maintained. The court succinctly explains:
Agredano purchased a 1987 Nissan Pathfinder at [a government]
auction. The vehicle had been seized by Customs . . . when its
previous owner attempted to transport marijuana across the
Mexican border . . . . While Customs agents detected and removed
some of the marijuana at that time, more [OK, a mere seventeen
kilograms, or more than thirty-five pounds] remained in the
vehicle unbeknownst to Customs or Agredano. Several months
after the auction, . . . Agredano was traveling in the Pathfinder in
Mexico with . . . his business partner and brother-in-law. The two
men were stopped at a checkpoint by Mexican soldiers who
inspected the vehicle and found the hidden marijuana. Both men
were arrested and spent nearly a year in prison before being
216
exonerated by a Mexican appellate court . . . .
217

After being denied a remedy in District Court, Agredano sought
relief in the Court of Federal Claims. Chief Judge Emily Hewitt
crafted a lengthy, detailed opinion, in which she determined that the
government breached its contract when it sold Agredano an
218
automobile with a stunning quantity of marijuana hidden inside.
Among other things, Judge Hewitt explained that, although
Agredano knew the cars available at government auctions had been
seized, he had no knowledge as to where or why they were seized.
Agredano previously had purchased several vehicles at U.S.
219
government auctions without incident. In addition, “[p]laintiff was
unable to open the doors and inspect the interior of the [car]
220
directly,” and, more significantly, “[e]ven if plaintiff [and his
colleague] had been able to inspect the interior of the car, the

215. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 777 (arguing that “a formalist movement is
afoot” in the Federal Circuit).
216. Agredano, 595 F.3d at 1279–80.
217. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California
granted summary judgment against Agredano on his claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act claim because—regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred—his arrest occurred in Mexico, a foreign country. Agredano v. United
States, No. 02CV2243B, Docket Entry No. 71 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2004) (relying on
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)).
218. Agredano v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 416, 452 (2008), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011).
219. Id. at 421.
220. Id. at 422.
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testimony at trial established that they, as lay people, would have been
221
unlikely to discover the contraband themselves.” Indeed, “[s]everal
Customs agents testified that no layperson could discover hidden
222
contraband within a vehicle.”
Accordingly, the trial court found an implied-in-fact warranty that
223
the automobile was free from contraband at the time of sale.
“When plaintiff purchased the [car] from defendant, both parties
had the same expectation: that the [car] was free of all contraband.
That mutual and common expectation is the ‘meeting of minds’
224
within this contract.” Specifically, the trial court found that “the ‘as
is’ clause in the contract does not preclude the existence of a possible
implied-in-fact warranty in this case because the ‘as is’ clause does not
cover a situation in which defendant sells the [car] with concealed
225
contraband to plaintiff.”
The trial court awarded Agredano
$350,000 for attorneys fees incurred during his criminal proceedings
in Mexico; $48,000 for lost income; $10,000 for medical bills incurred
from the injuries and illnesses resulting from his imprisonment and
$80,000 for foreseeable future medical expenses; $12,500 for
psychiatric bills and $46,500 for reasonably foreseeable future
psychiatric expenses; $2,600 for automobile’s fair market value; and
$1,254 for Agredano’s family’s expenses bringing him supplies while
226
he was in prison.
The Federal Circuit reversed. The court tersely concluded that:
Customs’ responsibility to remove contraband from forfeited
vehicles does not provide a contractual warranty to future
purchasers of the vehicles that it has done so. . . . [T]he source of
any responsibility on the part of Customs to search vehicles and
remove contraband is its regulatory function[,] and a failure to
adequately perform this responsibility does not provide a
227
contractual remedy.
221. Id. at 436.
222. Id. at 445.
223. Id. at 430.
224. Id. at 440.
225. Id. at 435. Moreover, the “evidence at trial is consistent with the court’s
earlier holding that the ‘as is’ clause does not preclude the existence of an impliedin-fact warranty,(citation omitted) and demonstrates as well that, as a matter of fact,
plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to discover hidden narcotics in the
Pathfinder.” Id. at 437.
226. See id. at 452 (reciting the laundry list of damages Agredano incurred). “The
‘meeting of the minds’ in this case . . . is a mutual, if tacit, understanding, between
plaintiff and defendant that the Pathfinder was free of all contraband when
defendant sold the Pathfinder to plaintiff.” Id. at 430.
227. Agredano v. United States, 595 F.3d 1278, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011). Judge Dyk concurred:
Absent a contractual warranty disclaimer, . . . the sale of an automobile . . .
likely carries with it an implied-in-fact warranty of fitness, including a

2011]

2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS

1113

Given the trial court’s painstaking analysis, the Federal Circuit’s
conclusion seems not only incorrect, but unnecessarily timid.
Contract law serves, in large part, to allocate risk. As my predecessor
and colleague Emeritus Professor Ralph Nash explained:
[R]isk allocation generally occurs only when the results of strict
enforcement would be harsh. Hence, this reallocation is probably
better characterized as a safety valve releasing the pressure
generated by an agreement that does not satisfactorily resolve a
problem that occurs during performance. The price of this safety
valve is unpredictability. This price seems worth paying, however,
to assure that risk allocation between the parties retains some
degree of balance in terms of the events that actually occur during
228
contract performance.

The outcome in Agredano, by any objective measure, is harsh.
An individual purchased an automobile from the government, at
auction, for under $3,000. As a direct result, he and his colleague
sustained epic monetary and non-monetary damages.
The
government, rather than the individual, Mr. Agredano, was the party
to the transaction best positioned to avoid the risk associated with, or
absorb the harm caused by, the government’s failure to fulfill its
regulatory duty and discover contraband in the vehicle prior to its
229
resale. Nor is it reasonable to assume that either party anticipated
this particular risk or this result. It seems inexplicable that this
court—of all courts—could conclude that the proper allocation of

warranty that the vehicle does not contain illegal drugs. [Nonetheless, he
agrees] that the contract here explicitly disclaimed all warranties [and
concludes that the] government’s regulatory practice of inspecting such
vehicles for contraband cannot overcome this disclaimer.
Id. at 1282 (Dyk, J., concurring).
228. Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 693, 718 (1966) (primarily discussing pricing provisions).
229. Indeed, the United States was the superior risk bearer in this case:
The superior risk bearer is the party best positioned to (1) appraise, in
advance, the likelihood that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the
harm if it does occur, (2) insure against the risk, either through selfinsurance or market insurance, and (3) bear the cost of the harm. . . .
Similarly, the least cost risk avoider is the party best positioned to take
steps to avoid or minimize the harm.
Schooner & Siuda-Pfeffer, supra note 187, at 310–11 (citing, inter alia, Christopher J.
Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 322–23
(1982); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View at the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (analyzing risk allocation in the context
of contract impossibility)). But see Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract:
Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 515–18
(1999) (suggesting that the allocation of risk to the party best able to bear the risk is
less appropriate when the government is one of the contracting parties because
private sector assumptions of efficiency fail when transported to the public sector).
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risk here—either in this case or a matter of precedent—should
expose an individual to this type of harm caused directly by
government action (or inaction) without appropriate government
compensation. All of which begs the question: What is the proper
role of the Federal Circuit?
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APPENDIX A
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ACTIVITY PER FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGE 2010
Judge

Participated
Without Writing

Drafted
Decision

Bryson

Arctic Slope;
Ham Investments;
Pai Corp;
Sullivan

Anchor
Savings;
ATK Thiokol;
Donley;
Nebraska;

Lourie

Arctic Slope;
Ham Investments;
Holland;
Maropakis;
Nebraska;
Precision Pine;
Resource

McHugh

Newman

Anchor Savings;
Bormes;
Maropakis;
Nebraska;
Savantage

Prost

Nebraska;
Pai Corp;
Savantage

Holland;
Precision Pine

Rader

Anchor Savings;
Ham Investments;
Holland;
Nebraska

Bormes

Dyk

Arctic Slope;
Resource

Moore

ATK Thiokol;
Bormes;
McHugh;
Nebraska

Linn

Donley;
Nebraska

Gajarsa
Michel

Dissenting
Decision

Agredano;
Nebraska

Maropakis
Pai Corp

Nebraska

Concurring
Decision

Nebraska
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Senior Judges

Clevenger

Agredano;
Donley;
Sullivan

Mayer

Precision Pine;
Nebraska

Archer

ATK Thiokol

Friedman

McHugh

Plager
Schall

Sullivan
Nebraska

Kendall230

Resource

Agredano

230. District Judge sitting by designation.
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APPENDIX B
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ACTIVITY PER
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGE 2009–2010 COMBINED
Judge

Participated Without
Writing

Drafted
Decision

Concurring
Decision

Dissenting
Decision

Bryson

Arctic Slope II;
Biltmore;
Carolina;
Ham Investments;
LAI Services;
Pai Corp;
Sullivan

Anchor
Savings;
Arctic Slope I;
Astoria;
ATK Thiokol;
Donley;
Grant County;
Nebraska;
Savantage;

Lourie

Arctic Slope I;
Arctic Slope II;
Bank of Guam;
Ham Investments;
Holland;
Maropakis;
Nebraska;
Precision Pine;
Raytheon;
Republic;
Resource;
States Roofing;
Winter

McHugh

Telecom

Newman

Alabama Aircraft;
American Contractors;
Anchor Savings;
Bormes;
Labatt;
Maropakis;
Nebraska;
Savantage;
Stockton

Slattery;
States Roofing

Bell
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Prost

Centech;
Nebraska;
Pai Corp;
Savantage;
Telecom

Axiom;
Bell;
Holland;
Precision Pine;
Winter

Rader

Anchor Savings;
Arko;
Astoria;
Bell;
Centech;
Ham Investments;
Holland;
Nebraska;
Tyler Const;
Weeks Marine

Bormes;
Carolina

Dyk

Arko;
Astoria;
First Home

American
Contractors;
Arctic Slope II;
Biltmore;
Daewoo;
Resource;
Telecom

Moore

Alabama Aircraft;
ATK Thiokol;
Bormes;
McHugh;
Moore;
Nebraska

Linn

Axiom;
Donley;
Grant County;
LAI Services;
Nebraska

Maropakis

Gajarsa

Bank of Guam;
Stockton

First Home;
Pai Corp;
Raytheon

Michel

Nebraska;
States Roofing;
Tip Top;
Winter

McDonnell

Agredano;
Nebraska
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Weeks Marine

Nebraska;
Slattery
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Schall

American Contractors;
Grant County;
Labatt;
Nebraska;
Republic

Bank of
Guam;
Centech;
LAI Services;
Weeks Marine
Senior Judges

Clevenger

Agredano;
Donley;
Sullivan

Republic

Mayer

Arctic Slope I;
Carolina;
Daewoo;
First Home;
Nebraska;
Precision Pine;
Raytheon;
Tyler Const

Agredano;
Labatt

Archer
Friedman

ATK Thiokol
Daewoo;
McHugh

Plager

Biltmore;
Sullivan

Tyler Const
Alabama
Aircraft;
Stockton
Judges Sitting By Designation

231

Arterton
232

Axiom

Huff
Kendall233
Posner234

McDonnell
Resource
Tip Top

Walker235
Ward236

Slattery

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Arko

District Judge sitting by designation.
District Judge sitting by designation.
District Judge sitting by designation
Circuit Judge sitting by designation.
Chief District Judge sitting by designation.
District Judge sitting by designation.
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